Wooing Pakistan’s Moderate Center

To a certain degree, Pakistan’s return to democratic rule was expected to slow its already tepid cooperation with the United States on the global war on terror. The two major democratically elected parties have to take into consideration the popular pulse in ways Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s regime did not.
Moreover, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League both were chagrined by Washington’s long unstinted support for Musharraf. A belated American conversion to democratic rule was bound to leave residual discontent.
The Pakistani military, too, has become disenchanted, and not only because of Washington’s public moves to distance itself from the Musharraf regime. The region along the Afghan border where the Taleban and Al Qaeda enjoy safe haven has never been under Islamabad’s control. Over the last two years, hundreds of Pakistani soldiers have died trying to tame the tribes, something Washington has not acknowledged sufficiently.
Deploying US troops inside Pakistan to try to flush out Taleban and Al Qaeda forces would spark deadlier anti-American protests across the country. Washington is thus left with implorations to Pakistan’s good judgment.
And Congress seems to have risen to the task. Senators Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) plan to introduce legislation this month that would provide up to $15 billion in aid to Pakistan over the next 10 years for economic development, health and education. The underlying objective of winning over Pakistan’s moderate center is laudable. A democratic government in Islamabad is best placed to wean tribal leaders away from the Taleban and Al Qaeda. Sustained political and economic support from Washington would be central to that strategy. Lingering doubts about Washington’s commitment to Pakistan’s stability and progress would only encourage the PPP and PML to woo Islamic radicals to fortify their respective flanks, a course they adopted during much of the 1990s to the region’s and the world’s disadvantage.