When NATO stepped out of its regional jurisdiction in 2003 to lead the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, those running the organization had no illusions about the gravity of their task.
In its first military mission outside the Euro-Atlantic region, the North Atlantic Alliance faces a formidable opponent in a resurgent Taleban. NATO’s objectives are to assist the government of President Hamid Karzai in its efforts to rebuild and stabilize the country. Initially, NATO was present in the north and west of the country, as well as in the capital city, Kabul. However, at the end of July, NATO forces took over control from American troops in southern Afghanistan – the homeland of the Taleban, ousted from power by a U.S.-led coalition in 2001.
Since taking over military operations in southern Afghanistan, NATO has encountered fierce resistance from Taleban fighters. Attacks on NATO troops have increased and casualties have mounted on both sides. The insurgents are showing an offensive capacity that has caught NATO by surprise.
They have economics and geography on their side. The southern-most provinces -- particularly Kandahar and Helmand -- are the principal areas of drug production. Moreover, the region borders the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. Blood ties are no doubt thicker. Pakistan, moreover, has been less enthusiastic in its anti-Taleban campaign than in its drive against Al Qaeda.
All this has precipitated a sense of disquiet among many European governments, something that would surely grow as casualties mount. A recent request by senior NATO officials for more troops met a lukewarm response. Only Poland agreed to provide 1,000 soldiers, who won’t be available before February. Moreover, they are not expected to patrol the southern provinces.
There is a lot at stake for NATO in Afghanistan. Success in defeating the Taleban and in securing the government of President Karzai could set the stage for further global operations. Yet NATO is already committed in many operations around the globe, including Kosovo and Iraq. With new hot spots emerging regularly, mobilizing additional personnel and assets would prove to be a huge challenge. Much depends on the outcome in Afghanistan.
Tuesday, September 26, 2006
Thursday, September 21, 2006
A Coup And A King
The calmness with which Thais responded to this week’s military coup must not lull the generals into complacency. Cleaning up the mess they accused Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of creating would require a degree of determination and dexterity few juntas in history have been able to muster.
To be sure, Thaksin was one of Thailand’s most popular and successful politicians. He emerged when the country really needed a strong-willed leader in the aftermath of the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis. Thaksin presided over the resurgence of what has certainly become one of Asia’s most formidable economies.
Although he continued to command the loyalty of rural Thais, Thaksin’s style alienated his political opponents and urban voters. Sustained protests in Bangkok and other cities against the premier’s alleged financial irregularities involving his billion dollar family fortune compelled Thaksin to hold early elections. An opposition boycott and technical hitches subverted the vote. Under sustained pressure from the streets earlier this year, Thaksin had made a clear pledge to quit power. However, he remained firmly in the saddle.
Amid the polarization, King Bhumibol Adulyadej appealed for restraint and reason. Although Thais had experienced 17 coups since the 1930s, the prospect of another one was hardly on many people’s minds.
Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, the army chief, insists his takeover enjoys the blessings of the widely revered monarch. Bhumibol’s silence over the crisis suggests that may be the case. But for how long?
Gen. Sonthi has pledged to hand over power to a civilian administration as soon as possible. But, then, no military ruler has insisted he was in for the long haul. Once an interim government is in place and fresh elections are held in a year under a new constitution, the army will have to return to the barracks. The legitimacy as well as the viability of the process would ultimately depend on the degree of cooperation Thai political parties extend to the military leaders.
To be sure, Thaksin was one of Thailand’s most popular and successful politicians. He emerged when the country really needed a strong-willed leader in the aftermath of the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis. Thaksin presided over the resurgence of what has certainly become one of Asia’s most formidable economies.
Although he continued to command the loyalty of rural Thais, Thaksin’s style alienated his political opponents and urban voters. Sustained protests in Bangkok and other cities against the premier’s alleged financial irregularities involving his billion dollar family fortune compelled Thaksin to hold early elections. An opposition boycott and technical hitches subverted the vote. Under sustained pressure from the streets earlier this year, Thaksin had made a clear pledge to quit power. However, he remained firmly in the saddle.
Amid the polarization, King Bhumibol Adulyadej appealed for restraint and reason. Although Thais had experienced 17 coups since the 1930s, the prospect of another one was hardly on many people’s minds.
Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, the army chief, insists his takeover enjoys the blessings of the widely revered monarch. Bhumibol’s silence over the crisis suggests that may be the case. But for how long?
Gen. Sonthi has pledged to hand over power to a civilian administration as soon as possible. But, then, no military ruler has insisted he was in for the long haul. Once an interim government is in place and fresh elections are held in a year under a new constitution, the army will have to return to the barracks. The legitimacy as well as the viability of the process would ultimately depend on the degree of cooperation Thai political parties extend to the military leaders.
Wednesday, September 13, 2006
A Long-Running Love-Hate Saga
The attack on the American Embassy in Damascus has fixed the spotlight on the complicated relations between the two countries. The preeminent Arab rejectionist during decades of US-driven Middle East peacemaking, Syria has always benefited from one odd American ability: the juxtaposition of its antipathy for the Baathist regime with its eagerness to cultivate it as a serious partner.
American secretaries of state hardly complained when they were left waiting for hours in Damascus for an audience with the wily Hafez Al Assad. American presidents easily took time off in Vienna or Geneva from their extended global travels to meet the Syrian leader.
During the first Gulf War, Assad’s tacit support for the US-led campaign to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait played a major part in granting the mission the legitimacy of Arab support. There is reason to believe that a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty might have been pulled off had Assad lived a little longer.
Bashar Al Assad’s elevation to the presidency brought a whiff of optimism. The generational newness the new leader brought to his job could only benefit the relationship. Bashar Assad’s eye for the change sweeping the world around Syria could only precipitate those much needed reforms.
But Bashar not only retained the old guard his father carefully cultivated, he also shed few of the repressiveness of the regime. Still, many rosy-eyed analysts remained hopeful that the former ophthalmologist would come out with a modern vision for the region. There is considerable speculation that an initiative toward formal Syrian-Israeli peace may be in the works at this very moment.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praised Syrian authorities for their handling of the embassy attack, and expressed her condolences for the death of the Syrian security officer. A press statement from the Syrian Embassy in Washington was hardly conciliatory. “It is regrettable that US policies in the Middle East have fueled extremism, terrorism and anti-US sentiment,” it said. That must have been posturing, given the kind of pressure Damascus is from Washington. US officials didn’t seem too bothered by Syria’s roughness either.
Listed by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, Syria continues to figure high in the imperatives of Washington’s Mideast diplomacy. Unofficial sources suggest that Syria has dramatically expanded the extent of its cooperation with the US-led war on Al Qaida in recent years.
We are told this cooperation included the reported US submission of questions for an al-Qaida figure in Syrian custody in 2002; Syria’s 2003 arrest of Al Qaida couriers allegedly carrying $23.5 million; and Syrian support for Lebanese security activities against Al Qaida-linked groups in 2003 that prevented attacks on US interests and the US ambassador to Lebanon.
In public, the mood continues be one of defiance. The US withdrew its ambassador to Damascus following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Al Hariri in February 2005. Early reports from a UN probe into the killing implicated top Syrian officials – perhaps even Bashar Assad – in the murder plot. Lebanese popular pressure forced Syria to pull its troops from its neighbor.
Syria, together with Iran, sprung back into action this year through its Hezbollah proxy. Syrian support for Hezbollah during the massive Israeli attacks may even have erased some of the Lebanese people’s hostility.
Doubtless, the US and Syria have a mutual interest in preventing the rise of militant Sunni Islam. Washington, on the other hand, would love to drive Damascus and Teheran wide apart in the larger regional scheme of things.
Although some American officials, in the afterglow of Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, called for regime change in Syria, the US seems to have been chastened – and not just by the Iraq quagmire. Washington knows that sudden convulsion could create a political vacuum the Muslim Brotherhood could exploit. Thus the love-hate relationship continues.
American secretaries of state hardly complained when they were left waiting for hours in Damascus for an audience with the wily Hafez Al Assad. American presidents easily took time off in Vienna or Geneva from their extended global travels to meet the Syrian leader.
During the first Gulf War, Assad’s tacit support for the US-led campaign to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait played a major part in granting the mission the legitimacy of Arab support. There is reason to believe that a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty might have been pulled off had Assad lived a little longer.
Bashar Al Assad’s elevation to the presidency brought a whiff of optimism. The generational newness the new leader brought to his job could only benefit the relationship. Bashar Assad’s eye for the change sweeping the world around Syria could only precipitate those much needed reforms.
But Bashar not only retained the old guard his father carefully cultivated, he also shed few of the repressiveness of the regime. Still, many rosy-eyed analysts remained hopeful that the former ophthalmologist would come out with a modern vision for the region. There is considerable speculation that an initiative toward formal Syrian-Israeli peace may be in the works at this very moment.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice praised Syrian authorities for their handling of the embassy attack, and expressed her condolences for the death of the Syrian security officer. A press statement from the Syrian Embassy in Washington was hardly conciliatory. “It is regrettable that US policies in the Middle East have fueled extremism, terrorism and anti-US sentiment,” it said. That must have been posturing, given the kind of pressure Damascus is from Washington. US officials didn’t seem too bothered by Syria’s roughness either.
Listed by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, Syria continues to figure high in the imperatives of Washington’s Mideast diplomacy. Unofficial sources suggest that Syria has dramatically expanded the extent of its cooperation with the US-led war on Al Qaida in recent years.
We are told this cooperation included the reported US submission of questions for an al-Qaida figure in Syrian custody in 2002; Syria’s 2003 arrest of Al Qaida couriers allegedly carrying $23.5 million; and Syrian support for Lebanese security activities against Al Qaida-linked groups in 2003 that prevented attacks on US interests and the US ambassador to Lebanon.
In public, the mood continues be one of defiance. The US withdrew its ambassador to Damascus following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Al Hariri in February 2005. Early reports from a UN probe into the killing implicated top Syrian officials – perhaps even Bashar Assad – in the murder plot. Lebanese popular pressure forced Syria to pull its troops from its neighbor.
Syria, together with Iran, sprung back into action this year through its Hezbollah proxy. Syrian support for Hezbollah during the massive Israeli attacks may even have erased some of the Lebanese people’s hostility.
Doubtless, the US and Syria have a mutual interest in preventing the rise of militant Sunni Islam. Washington, on the other hand, would love to drive Damascus and Teheran wide apart in the larger regional scheme of things.
Although some American officials, in the afterglow of Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, called for regime change in Syria, the US seems to have been chastened – and not just by the Iraq quagmire. Washington knows that sudden convulsion could create a political vacuum the Muslim Brotherhood could exploit. Thus the love-hate relationship continues.
Thursday, September 07, 2006
The Blair Ditch Project
Even in the midst of the most serious revolt against his leadership, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has held his ground. Although he does not intend to go on and on forever, Blair has always insisted, he cannot and will not offer a deadline for this departure because that would paralyze the government and the ruling Labour party. In his latest remarks on the subject, the prime minister has merely shortened his vision of incumbency. He certainly has disappointed those who see Labour’s renewal clearly rooted in an immediate change of leadership.
The punditocracy has long affirmed the profound extent to which Blair has lost control of his party. For Gordon Brown, the chancellor of the exchequer and Blair’s presumptive successor, those sustained utterances must have made the wait excruciatingly long. Amid reports of a shouting match between Blair and Brown, precipitated by the resignation of at least eight junior ministers, the chancellor chose to put up a public appearance of loyalty to his boss. Hours before Blair announced he would quit within the next 12 months, Brown told reporters that any decision on a departure should certainly be Blair’s to make. Behind that façade of fealty, Brown emphasized how much higher he regards his obligations to the party – no doubt a subtle suggestion to the premier.
In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, when Blair’s downhill slide accelerated, factional infighting was a luxury Labour could afford. With the Tories in almost perpetual disarray and the Liberal Democrats struggling to expand their base, Labour leaders knew voters had no alternative to putting up with an accumulation of scandals and double dealing in the ruling party.
In March, Blair sounded confident enough to suggest he might have made a “strategic” mistake by promising to step down before the next general election. Since then, the Tories’ remarkable gains in the local elections have intensified pressure on the prime minister. Now that he has made a more explicit commitment to step down, can Blair count on Brown’s full support for the remainder of his agenda? More importantly, can all this bitterness allow Brown to maintain an ability to implement the party agenda and to lead a united Labour to another electoral victory?
The punditocracy has long affirmed the profound extent to which Blair has lost control of his party. For Gordon Brown, the chancellor of the exchequer and Blair’s presumptive successor, those sustained utterances must have made the wait excruciatingly long. Amid reports of a shouting match between Blair and Brown, precipitated by the resignation of at least eight junior ministers, the chancellor chose to put up a public appearance of loyalty to his boss. Hours before Blair announced he would quit within the next 12 months, Brown told reporters that any decision on a departure should certainly be Blair’s to make. Behind that façade of fealty, Brown emphasized how much higher he regards his obligations to the party – no doubt a subtle suggestion to the premier.
In the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, when Blair’s downhill slide accelerated, factional infighting was a luxury Labour could afford. With the Tories in almost perpetual disarray and the Liberal Democrats struggling to expand their base, Labour leaders knew voters had no alternative to putting up with an accumulation of scandals and double dealing in the ruling party.
In March, Blair sounded confident enough to suggest he might have made a “strategic” mistake by promising to step down before the next general election. Since then, the Tories’ remarkable gains in the local elections have intensified pressure on the prime minister. Now that he has made a more explicit commitment to step down, can Blair count on Brown’s full support for the remainder of his agenda? More importantly, can all this bitterness allow Brown to maintain an ability to implement the party agenda and to lead a united Labour to another electoral victory?
Saturday, September 02, 2006
MADness On Iran
Now that Iran has used the latest United Nations deadline on its controversial nuclear program to reassert its legal right to enrichment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the international community is mulling those elusive additional options.
The question is stark. Can anything stop Teheran, bolstered by growing oil revenues as well as the triumph of its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, over Israel, from accomplishing its ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons?
There probably was a time when the mullahs’ unpopularity had sustained the democracy movement. Now the democrats either support Iran’s nuclear program or are too afraid to challenge it. US troops on both flanks – Afghanistan in the east and Iraq in the west – have not deterred the theocracy. The Islamist revolution of 1979 has won a new lease on life that may keep it going for another generation.
Considering America’s dismal standing in the world, China and Russia would probably have blocked Washington’s efforts in the Security Council even without their commercial interests in Iran. The Europeans want to maintain the two-year-old fiction called dialogue with Teheran.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may be the preeminent rabble-rouser in the region. What he says is certainly what Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini thinks. Ahmadinejad’s predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, wasn’t taken too seriously in Washington when he was in office. A tourist who happens to be a former president of Iran would hardly amount to much in Washington. In any case, the world wasn’t really sure whether Khatami genuinely was a reformer or just masquerading as one at a time when the Islamic regime was facing its worst crisis on the streets and in the central bank.
In public, the urgency of continued dialogue with Iran will continue to be stressed internationally. For a country in its 28th year amid empty talk of rewards and penalties, a sudden change of behavior would be irrational.
A little Cold War-type behavior would be in order -- specifically mutual assured destruction. Ahmadinejad wants to nuke Israel and wipe it off the map. Israel can use its nukes to deter the Iranian president. Ahmadinejad probably would like to nuke America too, but he hasn’t said so. As for the Europeans, he knows he would have, in the words of a perceptive observer, to nuke the Little Satan and Big Satan before targeting the Middle Satan. That’s the stick.
Iran essentially wants security guarantees and recognition as a legitimate regional power. The US can provide that carrot. A Shah-era anointment of Iran as the regional cop is not irrational as it might sound. Voices in favor of engaging with Teheran have grown in influential Washington circles. Moreover, Shiite Iran would prove an important ally against Bin Ladenism and other radical manifestations of anti-Americanism occurring from the rival Sunni Islamists.
The question is stark. Can anything stop Teheran, bolstered by growing oil revenues as well as the triumph of its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, over Israel, from accomplishing its ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons?
There probably was a time when the mullahs’ unpopularity had sustained the democracy movement. Now the democrats either support Iran’s nuclear program or are too afraid to challenge it. US troops on both flanks – Afghanistan in the east and Iraq in the west – have not deterred the theocracy. The Islamist revolution of 1979 has won a new lease on life that may keep it going for another generation.
Considering America’s dismal standing in the world, China and Russia would probably have blocked Washington’s efforts in the Security Council even without their commercial interests in Iran. The Europeans want to maintain the two-year-old fiction called dialogue with Teheran.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may be the preeminent rabble-rouser in the region. What he says is certainly what Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini thinks. Ahmadinejad’s predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, wasn’t taken too seriously in Washington when he was in office. A tourist who happens to be a former president of Iran would hardly amount to much in Washington. In any case, the world wasn’t really sure whether Khatami genuinely was a reformer or just masquerading as one at a time when the Islamic regime was facing its worst crisis on the streets and in the central bank.
In public, the urgency of continued dialogue with Iran will continue to be stressed internationally. For a country in its 28th year amid empty talk of rewards and penalties, a sudden change of behavior would be irrational.
A little Cold War-type behavior would be in order -- specifically mutual assured destruction. Ahmadinejad wants to nuke Israel and wipe it off the map. Israel can use its nukes to deter the Iranian president. Ahmadinejad probably would like to nuke America too, but he hasn’t said so. As for the Europeans, he knows he would have, in the words of a perceptive observer, to nuke the Little Satan and Big Satan before targeting the Middle Satan. That’s the stick.
Iran essentially wants security guarantees and recognition as a legitimate regional power. The US can provide that carrot. A Shah-era anointment of Iran as the regional cop is not irrational as it might sound. Voices in favor of engaging with Teheran have grown in influential Washington circles. Moreover, Shiite Iran would prove an important ally against Bin Ladenism and other radical manifestations of anti-Americanism occurring from the rival Sunni Islamists.
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