BRITISH Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared flippant when he recently conceded he might have made a mistake by promising to step down before the next general election. In fact, the precise words he used, in remarks to Radio Australia after attending the Commonwealth Games, were “strategic mistake”.
Blair is too smart not to recognize that, by outlasting his predecessors, he has entered a volatile zone. Even the once-invincible Margaret Thatcher had to succumb to her own MPs.
With Iraq threatening to define much of his legacy, Blair recognizes the importance of stepping down when things are in relative good shape. While the worst of Iraq may have already etched itself on his report card, Blair is still vulnerable in other areas. Education and health reforms, together with the ‘loan for peerages’ scandal, could snowball into a major crisis. Blair’s designated successor, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, seems to be getting a little impatient these days. His recent budget speech sounded more like an extended job application, the venerable Financial Times noted in an editorial.
The chancellor, who has observed the chain of command with relative deference, may be less inclined to do so in direct proportion to the frequency with which Blair voices his second thoughts in public.
At moments, Blair, like most people, perhaps ponders the reasons for his success. That palpable but inexplicable gift for winning elections? Deep faith in his own correctness and his ability to eventually convince most Britons of that? Or simple luck? Can his itch for continued incumbency survive the transience of individualism in democratic politics?
Technically, term limits may be an alien concept at No. 10 Downing Street; Blair’s predecessors have contended with the unwritten limits imposed by public perceptions and political realities. Why is Blair regretting having self-imposed his limit?
Perhaps because of the lame-duck status he believes he might have conferred on himself. Even Gordon Brown, after all, knows that having to depend on Tory votes in parliament is no hallmark of strategic smartness.
Friday, March 31, 2006
Tuesday, March 28, 2006
Cold War II?
Another western experiment in transplanting democracy on eastern soil has come undone. A little over a year after the triumphant Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which seemed to have put the former Soviet republic on a firmly pro-western course, Moscow has emerged the clear winner.
President Victor Yushchenko has been humbled at the polls. His party came out a poor third behind the groupings headed by Yulia Tymoshenko, his former ally, and Viktor Yanukovich, his opponent in the disputed 2004 presidential elections.
Now, it would be premature to write off Ukrainians’ aspirations for western-style democracy. Ukraine’s elections were the first in the former Soviet Union to be certifiably free and fair, barring, of course, the three Baltic republics. Ukrainian voters have proved they can change their government through an election, in sharp contrast to the presidential election in Belarus next door. More importantly, Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and the other leaders of the Orange Revolution still have a majority in the new parliament.
The logical course for President Yushchenko would be to appoint Tymoshenko as premier. The problem, though, is that Yushchenko last summer had sacked the charismatic populist. Mutual antipathy for Yanukovich and his Regions party, which emerged as the largest bloc in the party, can only go so far in reviving those heady days.
All the same, cold political realism might spur Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to bury the hatchet and roar ahead. This could have been a safe course had the former allies only harbored personal differences.
While Tymoshenko shares Yushchenko’s zeal for integration with the European Union, she is less enthusiastic on joining NATO. Moreover, the gaps in economic policies between the two are stark. Yushchenko remains committed to liberal economic reform, while Tymoshenko is more enamored of sprinkles of welfare spending. Tymoshenko antipathy to big business also sets her apart.
Tymoshenko could worsen Ukraine's relations with Moscow, especially considering her campaign pledge to revoke the controversial gas contract signed this year. Making the Orange coalition work could prove decidedly more complicated than resurrecting it.
Russian President Vladimir Putin will no doubt be interesting in all the wiggle room he can find in the corridors of power in Kiev to stall the country’s pro-western slide.
As for the rest of the world, Ukraine’s election probably doesn’t signify the onset of a new Cold War between the East and West. Considering the rate at which the mercury is falling in relations between Moscow and Washington, it wouldn’t hurt to start bundling up.
President Victor Yushchenko has been humbled at the polls. His party came out a poor third behind the groupings headed by Yulia Tymoshenko, his former ally, and Viktor Yanukovich, his opponent in the disputed 2004 presidential elections.
Now, it would be premature to write off Ukrainians’ aspirations for western-style democracy. Ukraine’s elections were the first in the former Soviet Union to be certifiably free and fair, barring, of course, the three Baltic republics. Ukrainian voters have proved they can change their government through an election, in sharp contrast to the presidential election in Belarus next door. More importantly, Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and the other leaders of the Orange Revolution still have a majority in the new parliament.
The logical course for President Yushchenko would be to appoint Tymoshenko as premier. The problem, though, is that Yushchenko last summer had sacked the charismatic populist. Mutual antipathy for Yanukovich and his Regions party, which emerged as the largest bloc in the party, can only go so far in reviving those heady days.
All the same, cold political realism might spur Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to bury the hatchet and roar ahead. This could have been a safe course had the former allies only harbored personal differences.
While Tymoshenko shares Yushchenko’s zeal for integration with the European Union, she is less enthusiastic on joining NATO. Moreover, the gaps in economic policies between the two are stark. Yushchenko remains committed to liberal economic reform, while Tymoshenko is more enamored of sprinkles of welfare spending. Tymoshenko antipathy to big business also sets her apart.
Tymoshenko could worsen Ukraine's relations with Moscow, especially considering her campaign pledge to revoke the controversial gas contract signed this year. Making the Orange coalition work could prove decidedly more complicated than resurrecting it.
Russian President Vladimir Putin will no doubt be interesting in all the wiggle room he can find in the corridors of power in Kiev to stall the country’s pro-western slide.
As for the rest of the world, Ukraine’s election probably doesn’t signify the onset of a new Cold War between the East and West. Considering the rate at which the mercury is falling in relations between Moscow and Washington, it wouldn’t hurt to start bundling up.
Sunday, March 26, 2006
Mullah Machinations
Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani has become an energetic supporter of talks between Iran and the United States on stabilizing his country. Talabani, a Kurd, has won admiration in certain quarters of the United States for his mature and persistent efforts to bring about reconciliation between Iraq’s once-dominant Sunnis and majority Shias.
It’s when Talabani joins Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khameini in endorsing the opening of talks between the firm allies turned sworn enemies that things become murkier.
Undoubtedly, the post-Saddam Hussein empowerment of Iraqi Shias has raised the profile of Iran. Ayatollah Sistani and interim prime minister Ibrahim al Jaafari, among other Shia leaders, spent long years of exile in Iran during the Saddam era.
Such links alone cannot be a guarantor of friendship and amity. Years of exile in Iraq during the Shah’s reign didn’t stop Ayatollah Khomeini from waging war with Saddam Hussein’s regime.
With American forces entrenched in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran certainly is feeling squeezed. The escalating row over Teheran’s nuclear program, western estimates that the mullahs are sheltering Al Qaeda leaders, including perhaps Osama bin Laden’s immediate relatives, and the pariah status decades of sanctions have imposed have contributed to this sudden change of heart. That’s the charitable explanation. If Ayatollah Khameini wants a deal with the “Great Satan” he continues to denounce, there can hardly be much piety in his purpose.
Washington, for its part, is wearied. The untold story of the Islamic Revolution is how the mullahs tricked President Jimmy Carter into switching American support from the Shah to the revolutionaries. The assortment of opposition figures like Mehdi Bazargan, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, Karim Sanjabi and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh came in handy for Khomeini as the mullahs were consolidating their power. Ever since Iranian radicals overran the American Embassy, hard-line mullahs have remained dominant.
After much estrangement, the mullahs tricked the U.S. and the West into believing in the reformist credentials of former president Mohammed Khatami. After the 9/11 attacks, the Iranian theocracy allowed students to hold a vigil in memory of the dead. Clearly, this gesture won over the hearts of many Americans embittered by the humiliation of the hostage ordeal. The shrewd mullahs succeeded in buying time for their nuclear program and other adventures that may yet come to light.
Iranian exiles, including the former crown prince Reza Pahlavi, hardly have a forward-looking agenda. After the Pentagon’s misguided courtship of Ahmed Chalabi and Co. the Americans have recognized the resiliency that comes with on-the-ground experience.
The mullahs have craftily positioned themselves in a win-win position. They intend to use a modicum of cooperation in Iraq to bolster the image of themselves as responsible. If the nuclear prowess of a responsible country like India can win the support of Washington, why shouldn’t Teheran’s? Whether the United States will demonstrate the sagacity to see through the charade is a different matter.
As for Talabani, what does he have to lose? The longer the Shias and Sunnis are at each others’ throats, Iraq’s Kurds can have the best of all worlds. Roping in Teheran and Washington to directly sort out that part of the triangular conflict would ensure greater room for maneuver for the Kurds.
History and geography, after all, have conspired to bestow a level of respect and recognition on Iraqi Kurds that their brethren in Turkey, Syria and Iran can’t even dream of.
It’s when Talabani joins Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khameini in endorsing the opening of talks between the firm allies turned sworn enemies that things become murkier.
Undoubtedly, the post-Saddam Hussein empowerment of Iraqi Shias has raised the profile of Iran. Ayatollah Sistani and interim prime minister Ibrahim al Jaafari, among other Shia leaders, spent long years of exile in Iran during the Saddam era.
Such links alone cannot be a guarantor of friendship and amity. Years of exile in Iraq during the Shah’s reign didn’t stop Ayatollah Khomeini from waging war with Saddam Hussein’s regime.
With American forces entrenched in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran certainly is feeling squeezed. The escalating row over Teheran’s nuclear program, western estimates that the mullahs are sheltering Al Qaeda leaders, including perhaps Osama bin Laden’s immediate relatives, and the pariah status decades of sanctions have imposed have contributed to this sudden change of heart. That’s the charitable explanation. If Ayatollah Khameini wants a deal with the “Great Satan” he continues to denounce, there can hardly be much piety in his purpose.
Washington, for its part, is wearied. The untold story of the Islamic Revolution is how the mullahs tricked President Jimmy Carter into switching American support from the Shah to the revolutionaries. The assortment of opposition figures like Mehdi Bazargan, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, Karim Sanjabi and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh came in handy for Khomeini as the mullahs were consolidating their power. Ever since Iranian radicals overran the American Embassy, hard-line mullahs have remained dominant.
After much estrangement, the mullahs tricked the U.S. and the West into believing in the reformist credentials of former president Mohammed Khatami. After the 9/11 attacks, the Iranian theocracy allowed students to hold a vigil in memory of the dead. Clearly, this gesture won over the hearts of many Americans embittered by the humiliation of the hostage ordeal. The shrewd mullahs succeeded in buying time for their nuclear program and other adventures that may yet come to light.
Iranian exiles, including the former crown prince Reza Pahlavi, hardly have a forward-looking agenda. After the Pentagon’s misguided courtship of Ahmed Chalabi and Co. the Americans have recognized the resiliency that comes with on-the-ground experience.
The mullahs have craftily positioned themselves in a win-win position. They intend to use a modicum of cooperation in Iraq to bolster the image of themselves as responsible. If the nuclear prowess of a responsible country like India can win the support of Washington, why shouldn’t Teheran’s? Whether the United States will demonstrate the sagacity to see through the charade is a different matter.
As for Talabani, what does he have to lose? The longer the Shias and Sunnis are at each others’ throats, Iraq’s Kurds can have the best of all worlds. Roping in Teheran and Washington to directly sort out that part of the triangular conflict would ensure greater room for maneuver for the Kurds.
History and geography, after all, have conspired to bestow a level of respect and recognition on Iraqi Kurds that their brethren in Turkey, Syria and Iran can’t even dream of.
Saturday, March 25, 2006
Iraq: The Case For Autocracy
Sectarian violence is a nice euphemism. But it hardly disguises much – at least not in Iraq. Since the Feb. 22 bombing and destruction of the Al-Askari shrine, one of the holiest sites of Shia Islam, Iraq has entered a full-scale civil war.
The daily body counts and fear levels attest to this. If not calling something by its name provides solace, then so be it. There’s little to take comfort from in that country any way.
The more important question is: Is the civil war all that surprising? Not for some of Iraq’s neighbors. In the months before the U.S.-led invasion, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa warned that the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime would open the gates of hell. In the Arab world, at least, all the talk about the Iraqis welcoming the Americans with flowers sounded ludicrous.
Once the dictator was ousted, the next job awaiting the U.S.-led forces was pretty obvious: contending with the political, religious, and ethnic conflicts Saddam had brutally kept in check. The transparency and openness the United States intended to encourage in Iraq was bound to expose the fiction Iraq is.
Like Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia, a unified Iraq was something sustained by a repressive regime. The U.S.-led military intervention precipitated the extreme dispersion of political forces. The anti-Saddam opposition was as strong as his regime. Once that edifice crumbled, the votaries of a new Iraq could hardly stop quarreling.
Last December’s elections only inaugurated an intensified conflict in which all the players are seeking to defend and promote their perceived vital interests. No wonder Washington's attempt to broker a power-sharing arrangement acceptable to the Shia, Sunni and Kurds has faltered.
Can the region and the wider world avoid the escalation of the Iraqi civil war? The installation of another authoritarian-type government might help. During his news conference last week, President George W. Bush virtually acknowledged that the United States has no prospect of a graceful exit during the remainder of his term.
President Bush needs to talk straight to the American people. The best justification for invading Iraq was the doctrine of pre-emption. The whole world believed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction; the world feared that Osama bin Laden wanted some of them to use against the United States.
If the threat of an alliance between the secular Baathists and the fundamentalist Bin Ladenists still sounds overblown, just try putting a face on today’s insurgency. The U.S. acted in good faith – or at least thought it did. If things went wrong, then that’s too bad. But what if all those WMDs the world couldn’t find in Iraq are already with Bin Laden wherever he may be hiding?
And, by the way, let’s forget this whole democracy business. Those heading a new Iraqi autocracy might turn out to be another bunch of SOBs. With timely American backing, they might end up being our SOBs, as LBJ used to say.
The daily body counts and fear levels attest to this. If not calling something by its name provides solace, then so be it. There’s little to take comfort from in that country any way.
The more important question is: Is the civil war all that surprising? Not for some of Iraq’s neighbors. In the months before the U.S.-led invasion, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa warned that the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime would open the gates of hell. In the Arab world, at least, all the talk about the Iraqis welcoming the Americans with flowers sounded ludicrous.
Once the dictator was ousted, the next job awaiting the U.S.-led forces was pretty obvious: contending with the political, religious, and ethnic conflicts Saddam had brutally kept in check. The transparency and openness the United States intended to encourage in Iraq was bound to expose the fiction Iraq is.
Like Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia, a unified Iraq was something sustained by a repressive regime. The U.S.-led military intervention precipitated the extreme dispersion of political forces. The anti-Saddam opposition was as strong as his regime. Once that edifice crumbled, the votaries of a new Iraq could hardly stop quarreling.
Last December’s elections only inaugurated an intensified conflict in which all the players are seeking to defend and promote their perceived vital interests. No wonder Washington's attempt to broker a power-sharing arrangement acceptable to the Shia, Sunni and Kurds has faltered.
Can the region and the wider world avoid the escalation of the Iraqi civil war? The installation of another authoritarian-type government might help. During his news conference last week, President George W. Bush virtually acknowledged that the United States has no prospect of a graceful exit during the remainder of his term.
President Bush needs to talk straight to the American people. The best justification for invading Iraq was the doctrine of pre-emption. The whole world believed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction; the world feared that Osama bin Laden wanted some of them to use against the United States.
If the threat of an alliance between the secular Baathists and the fundamentalist Bin Ladenists still sounds overblown, just try putting a face on today’s insurgency. The U.S. acted in good faith – or at least thought it did. If things went wrong, then that’s too bad. But what if all those WMDs the world couldn’t find in Iraq are already with Bin Laden wherever he may be hiding?
And, by the way, let’s forget this whole democracy business. Those heading a new Iraqi autocracy might turn out to be another bunch of SOBs. With timely American backing, they might end up being our SOBs, as LBJ used to say.
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