Are Sri Lanka’s main belligerents at war or at peace?
The question has become more important after Sri Lanka’s ruling party and the opposition agreed to work together towards a political settlement to the island’s bloody ethnic fighting which has claimed more than 60,000 lives.
Welcome as the development is, it only covers one of the country’s two major protagonists.
The Tamil Tigers’ suicide bombings on navy targets earlier this month, which killed nearly 100 sailors, made it difficult to believe that they were preparing to meet with government representatives in Geneva later in the month.
The ferocity of the Sri Lankan air force’s bombing campaign in the east raised similar doubts about the definition of peacemaking the Colombo government has adopted.
The peace process launched four years ago, after 28 years of civil war that claimed over 60,000 people, seemed promising. The 2002 ceasefire – the pivot of the peace process – lies in tatters. More than 1,000 people have died since violence surged in April. Some 220,000 have been displaced, mostly Tamils and Muslims in the north and east of the country, where the Tamil Tigers are fighting for an independent homeland.
It is easy to blame President Mahinda Rajapakse for the dissipation of conciliation. After all, he won power last year after taking a hard line against the conciliatory former premier Ranil Wickremesinghe, the man with whom he sealed that unity accord this week.
Rajapakse, to be sure, exploited Sinhalese fears that Wickremesinghe concessions to the rebels risked splitting the country. Yet Tamil Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran seemed fed up with the peace process long before Rajapakse arrived on the scene.
The Tamil Tigers launched violent attacks while Wickremesinghe was in office. By preventing pro-Wickremesinghe Tamils from casting their ballots in last year’s election, Prabhakaran virtually ensured Rajapakse’s triumph.
Despite the latest peace moves, Colombo is said to be planning to double defense spending to $1.3 billion next year. The rebels, for their part, have been warning in every way they can that conciliation cannot mean capitulation.
The best hope for peace is that neither side wants to be the first to announce a return to a full-scale war.
Monday, October 23, 2006
Wednesday, October 11, 2006
Either Way, Kim Jong-il Wins
Was it or wasn’t it? Did Kim Jong-il test a nuclear weapon and set off tremors seismologists in different countries measured so wildly differently?
Or did the eccentric North Korean leader mix tons of TNT with a cocktail of components intended to throw all those machines off course?
For Kim, at least, it makes no difference. Even before an official confirmation, critics were competing with one another to denounce North Korea’s brazen defiance of international opinion.
The rare admirer – like Iran – was no less effusive in praising the world’s last Stalinist outpost for standing up to the Americans.
When – or, more appropriately, if – it becomes conclusively known what triggered the tremors, what does the world do?
Repeat the same ritual of condemnations that would have lost its efficacy? Or simply withdraw the criticism should it be confirmed that Kim fooled the critics?
And Iran? Obviously it has the least to lose from any revelation that Kim’s nukes are a dud?
What if the test was for real? President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad would have an opportunity to reiterate support for Kim’s defiance of America laced with mockery of the primitiveness of the sole superpower’s mastery of the seismology. (And thereby encourage Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez to step in with his two cents?)
If Kim is insane, as some have suggested but most seem to believe, he makes a poor job of proving it.
Remember the missile test he conducted a couple of months ago? That prompted even the Democrats to position themselves as ardent champions of President George W. Bush’s missile defense program ahead of the November mid-term elections.
Those tests forced many to wonder how a government that can’t afford to feed its people pursue advanced defense programs through purchases on the black market?
If Kim kept his people hungry to save money for the nuclear and missile programs, then how could North Koreans still endure the pristine form of a system that has become a relic of human monstrosity in the rest of the world?
But how many people recall that the missile tests had failed? Either way, Kim wins.
Or did the eccentric North Korean leader mix tons of TNT with a cocktail of components intended to throw all those machines off course?
For Kim, at least, it makes no difference. Even before an official confirmation, critics were competing with one another to denounce North Korea’s brazen defiance of international opinion.
The rare admirer – like Iran – was no less effusive in praising the world’s last Stalinist outpost for standing up to the Americans.
When – or, more appropriately, if – it becomes conclusively known what triggered the tremors, what does the world do?
Repeat the same ritual of condemnations that would have lost its efficacy? Or simply withdraw the criticism should it be confirmed that Kim fooled the critics?
And Iran? Obviously it has the least to lose from any revelation that Kim’s nukes are a dud?
What if the test was for real? President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad would have an opportunity to reiterate support for Kim’s defiance of America laced with mockery of the primitiveness of the sole superpower’s mastery of the seismology. (And thereby encourage Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez to step in with his two cents?)
If Kim is insane, as some have suggested but most seem to believe, he makes a poor job of proving it.
Remember the missile test he conducted a couple of months ago? That prompted even the Democrats to position themselves as ardent champions of President George W. Bush’s missile defense program ahead of the November mid-term elections.
Those tests forced many to wonder how a government that can’t afford to feed its people pursue advanced defense programs through purchases on the black market?
If Kim kept his people hungry to save money for the nuclear and missile programs, then how could North Koreans still endure the pristine form of a system that has become a relic of human monstrosity in the rest of the world?
But how many people recall that the missile tests had failed? Either way, Kim wins.
Tuesday, October 03, 2006
The Stalin Connection
The latest flare-up in the troubled ties between Russia and Georgia may have subsided somewhat after Tblisi handed over four Russian military officers it had detained on espionage charges to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The next eruption may come any time.
Relations between the two former Soviet republics have taken a turn for the worse since the Rose Revolution catapulted pro-Western President Mikhail Saakashvili into power almost three years ago.
Moscow, which strenuously seeks to keep most of its fellow former Soviet states within its sphere of influence, believes a recalcitrant Georgia could sent the wrong message across the ‘near abroad’. It has been particularly swift and sweeping in its retaliation against Georgian transgressions, compared to those of other ex-Soviet constituents.
Describing the arrest of its soldiers as ‘state terrorism,’ Russia has cut off air, rail, bus, sea and postal communications, and has declined to purchase Georgian parts for locomotives. It is threatening further economic sanctions and stopping remittances from the more than 300,000 Georgians working in Russia.
Georgia, for its part, accuses Russia of backing the secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of its effort to keep the small nation in its firm grip. The Saakashvili government has been able to defy Moscow because it is confident of winning American support if push came to shove.
Admittedly, the stakes in region are significant for the West. Georgia and Azerbaijan form a gateway linking the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and are vital for the control of Central Asia’s massive fossil resources. Georgia's location is vital to NATO’s ability to secure the Black Sea region. For the United States, Georgia provides a platform to project power toward the Middle East.
Yet the Georgian president may have overplayed his hand this time. NATO’s refusal to be drawn into the dispute, along with a realization of the possible negative fallout of an escalation on Georgia’s local elections, may have persuaded Saakashvili to relent.
Yet the essential question remains. Why is Moscow so sensitive in its dealings with Georgia? Could there be a psychological dimension? After all, Joseph Stalin, the most dreaded Soviet leader whose legacy today’s Russia endures, was a Georgian.
Relations between the two former Soviet republics have taken a turn for the worse since the Rose Revolution catapulted pro-Western President Mikhail Saakashvili into power almost three years ago.
Moscow, which strenuously seeks to keep most of its fellow former Soviet states within its sphere of influence, believes a recalcitrant Georgia could sent the wrong message across the ‘near abroad’. It has been particularly swift and sweeping in its retaliation against Georgian transgressions, compared to those of other ex-Soviet constituents.
Describing the arrest of its soldiers as ‘state terrorism,’ Russia has cut off air, rail, bus, sea and postal communications, and has declined to purchase Georgian parts for locomotives. It is threatening further economic sanctions and stopping remittances from the more than 300,000 Georgians working in Russia.
Georgia, for its part, accuses Russia of backing the secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of its effort to keep the small nation in its firm grip. The Saakashvili government has been able to defy Moscow because it is confident of winning American support if push came to shove.
Admittedly, the stakes in region are significant for the West. Georgia and Azerbaijan form a gateway linking the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and are vital for the control of Central Asia’s massive fossil resources. Georgia's location is vital to NATO’s ability to secure the Black Sea region. For the United States, Georgia provides a platform to project power toward the Middle East.
Yet the Georgian president may have overplayed his hand this time. NATO’s refusal to be drawn into the dispute, along with a realization of the possible negative fallout of an escalation on Georgia’s local elections, may have persuaded Saakashvili to relent.
Yet the essential question remains. Why is Moscow so sensitive in its dealings with Georgia? Could there be a psychological dimension? After all, Joseph Stalin, the most dreaded Soviet leader whose legacy today’s Russia endures, was a Georgian.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)