With the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome approaching, the European Union is once again revved up by the idea of a formal constitution.
A union of some of the world’s most powerful and industrialized nations, the EU is integrating with the rest of the world economically and politically. In coming this far, the union has shed a lot of the continent’s history of carnage and convulsions. It is worth recalling that a key propellant of the Rome Treaty was the urgency to stop Europe’s internecine wars.
A common market, free trade area, open borders are but aspects of integration. A full-fledged constitution would formalize the quest for commonness gripping the continent as well as the aspirations of quarters beyond.
Eighteen of the 27 member states have ratified the draft constitution. Britain, the Czech Republic and Poland want a new, slimmed-down mini treaty. French and Dutch voters have altogether rejected it in referendums held over a year ago.
Creating a permanent president and foreign ministry, the logical culmination of full union, would be as arduous as working out the precise schedule for the entry of Turkey as a member.
Less palpable, though, is the suspicion that the European project is some kind of Catholic conspiracy. After all, four of the six original countries were mainly Catholic and most of the founding fathers were devout believers. Furthermore, European Christian Democracy is rooted in Catholicism. It is perhaps no accident that Catholic newcomers such as Spain and Portugal have found it easier to adapt to the EU than have Protestant members such as Britain or Sweden.
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
Saturday, January 13, 2007
National Sovereignty: Sacrosanct Again?
The Chinese and Russians have put the world on notice. Domestic denial of democracy and human rights is not a threat to international peace and security. So the U.N. Security Council had better stay out of Myanmar.
What business did the United States have pushing through a resolution it knew it couldn’t back up – diplomatically or militarily? John Bolton’s departure as ambassador deprived Washington the ability to even mount an effective rhetorical defense.
For the first time since the 1970s, Beijing and Moscow have forged a front to challenge the United States. They didn’t unite so audaciously before the resolutions preceding the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq four years ago. China, for its part, had begun abstaining from key votes, exhibiting a pragmatism that allowed others to interpret in their own ways. The Russians, never shy about projecting their national interests over international questions, saw the veto as one of the last remaining symbol of their superpower status and were determined to use it.
Why Myanmar?
Ever since the military junta in Yangon invalidated Aung San Suu Kyi’s massive electoral victory and threw her into jail, the world has been able to do little else than stand by. China, a key ally, provided diplomatic cover.
Myanmar’s neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, no great models of democracy themselves, were fed up with American lectures on morality. They granted Myanmar membership of the regional organization and cushioned the regime from international pressures.
The Nobel Peace Price didn’t get Suu Kyi anywhere. The vast reserves of natural gas have made the junta the darling of China and India. Had New Delhi gotten that vaunted Security Council privilege, it might have vetoed the U.S. resolution too.
Admittedly, the Russians and Chinese could defend Myanmar so openly because there was little cost in doing so. The United States wasn’t about to severe ties with Moscow or Beijing over that Asian outpost. Nor could Washington be expected to ignore the Security Council and launch a military expedition to turn Myanmar into a beacon of democracy and human rights.
Yet it would be wrong to consider the Sino-Russian alliance as an aberration. The two governments are the staunchest defenders of national sovereignty, for their own reasons. Neither wants U.N. missions in Tibet or Chechnya.
In building this façade of virtue, Beijing and Moscow have read the American public’s mood very well. After the Iraq debacle, democracy and human rights are extremely unlikely to rouse Americans into any form international intervention. Let there be no mistake, this reaffirmation of the sanctity of national sovereignty was carefully planned.
What business did the United States have pushing through a resolution it knew it couldn’t back up – diplomatically or militarily? John Bolton’s departure as ambassador deprived Washington the ability to even mount an effective rhetorical defense.
For the first time since the 1970s, Beijing and Moscow have forged a front to challenge the United States. They didn’t unite so audaciously before the resolutions preceding the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq four years ago. China, for its part, had begun abstaining from key votes, exhibiting a pragmatism that allowed others to interpret in their own ways. The Russians, never shy about projecting their national interests over international questions, saw the veto as one of the last remaining symbol of their superpower status and were determined to use it.
Why Myanmar?
Ever since the military junta in Yangon invalidated Aung San Suu Kyi’s massive electoral victory and threw her into jail, the world has been able to do little else than stand by. China, a key ally, provided diplomatic cover.
Myanmar’s neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, no great models of democracy themselves, were fed up with American lectures on morality. They granted Myanmar membership of the regional organization and cushioned the regime from international pressures.
The Nobel Peace Price didn’t get Suu Kyi anywhere. The vast reserves of natural gas have made the junta the darling of China and India. Had New Delhi gotten that vaunted Security Council privilege, it might have vetoed the U.S. resolution too.
Admittedly, the Russians and Chinese could defend Myanmar so openly because there was little cost in doing so. The United States wasn’t about to severe ties with Moscow or Beijing over that Asian outpost. Nor could Washington be expected to ignore the Security Council and launch a military expedition to turn Myanmar into a beacon of democracy and human rights.
Yet it would be wrong to consider the Sino-Russian alliance as an aberration. The two governments are the staunchest defenders of national sovereignty, for their own reasons. Neither wants U.N. missions in Tibet or Chechnya.
In building this façade of virtue, Beijing and Moscow have read the American public’s mood very well. After the Iraq debacle, democracy and human rights are extremely unlikely to rouse Americans into any form international intervention. Let there be no mistake, this reaffirmation of the sanctity of national sovereignty was carefully planned.
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