Beneath the tumult of the unrest in Tibet and the resultant rancor over the Beijing Olympics, a once-vaunted partnership has been cooling. Since 2003, the European Union and China have developed deep institutional links. Having put much political, diplomatic and financial capital into this relationship, Brussels has referred to China as a “strategic partner.”
At the practical level, there are over two dozen sectoral dialogues going on between the two sides. These encompass such diverse areas as energy, environmental protection, civil aviation, competition policy, intellectual property rights, consumer product safety, and maritime transport. To be sure, there has not been the same level of progress everywhere. Yet the breadth of engagement underscores the commitment of the parties to a long-term partnership.
The atmosphere, however, has shifted significantly since 2006. These Chinese government and people have become somewhat disenchanted by the EU’s attitude, especially in the context of the organization’s October 2006 China trade and policy papers.
In those papers, Brussels presented Beijing with a long list of requested changes in areas ranging from human rights and freedom of speech to intellectual property rights and economic and financial deregulation. Predictably, these demands deeply offended Chinese officials and scholars.
Undaunted, Brussels believes the EU-China Partnership and Cooperation Agreement will take relations to the next level. Others, however, see the new deal as little more than a codification of existing institutional ties. China, moreover, seems in no urgency to sign the agreement.
Disruptions in the Olympic torch in parts of Europe have raised Chinese distrust. Furthermore, the EU Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution condemning China’s crackdown in Tibet, even raising the possibility of an EU boycott of the Olympics.
The EU Parliament, which has a strong “Taiwan lobby,” has confronted Beijing several times over human rights. China complains the pan-European legislature has rarely passed any constructive resolutions.
The 25th EU-China human rights dialogue, which took place in Slovenia on May 15, sparked much dissatisfaction in Beijing. Yet the EU does not have the instruments to influence the human rights situation in China.
On Taiwan, a thorn in China’s ties with the western world, the EC does not have a position. All it has said is that it is in favor of a peaceful solution. From the EU’s standpoint, the lack of an outspoken position may be behind Beijing refusal to consider Europe as a serious global security player.
Europe became China’s biggest trading partner in 2004. Yet the reality remains that EU still exports more to Switzerland. The EC points to market access obstacles. The EU’s trade deficit with China is growing by €15 million per hour having reached € 160 billion in 2007, with total bilateral trade amounting to more than € 300 billion. There are 120 European anti-dumping cases against China at the World Trade Organization. Settling some of them remains an option for the EU.
An EU delegation traveled to Beijing on April 25 to launch the “EU-China High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue Mechanism.” The initiative was hobbled by complaints by European businesses operating in China. If the EU is running out of patience, then European protectionism and additional tariffs on goods made in China is rising up the agenda of Beijing.
Surely, Beijing does not want any more human rights resolutions from the EU. Moreover, it seeks advice on global and regional foreign and security policy behavior and conduct. Additionally, it expects substantive technology transfers and technical and financial assistance to promote a more sustainable, geographically more balanced and environmentally less damaging Chinese economic growth.
Those are hardly difficult demands, and Brussels will be investing €224 million by 2013 in economic, financial and technical assistance. Beijing wants more, such as the lifting of the EU weapons embargo imposed after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 and the granting of market economy status.
Amid these divergences, the language governing the relationship has changed. “Common values,” the dominant theme of the partnership, has been replaced by “converging interests.”
