The Bush administration’s half-heartedness in disclosing that coalition forces have discovered about 500 shells containing chemical weapons since 2003 -- mostly sarin nerve gas and mustard gas – is perplexing, to say the least.
After all, this White House has been pummeled mercilessly for its apparent failure to find Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, one of the key reasons the US invaded Iraq and overthrew the Baathist regime.
The president and his advisers have been called liars when the Clinton administration and the intelligence agencies of France, Russia and other nations had concluded that Saddam’s chemical-, biological- and nuclear-weapon capabilities posed a serious threat to international peace and stability.
Political opponents of the president and the press – dominated by Bush critics – have either rubbished the latest reports or simply ignored them. It becomes easier to flout the journalistic tenets of accuracy and fairness when the president’s approval ratings dip below 40 percent.
Yet there could have been genuine reasons for the White House’s timidity. If the United States had promptly announced the WMD discoveries, wouldn’t that have been tantamount to leading terrorists, including those from al-Qaeda, to the stockpiles?
This undoubtedly would have placed coalition troops at risk. Forced to choose between a marginal advantage in public relations and exposing troops to further harm, the White House reassuringly opted for the latter.
Speaking of al-Qaeda, a chemical attack would have been a monumental propaganda coup, enhancing recruitment and financial support. For Americans, morale in Iraq and on the home front would have plummeted.
Another reason for the White House diffidence might have been the urgency of protecting informants. The decline in human intelligence has been blamed for most of the bungling of the past decade. The US intelligence community is clearly on a campaign to strengthen its ability to get real information from real people on the ground.
Unprotected informants serve to silence ones still at work and dissuades many from offering their services. Here, too, the wider imperative of boosting America’s human-intelligence capabilities may have taken precedence over some media mileage.
One thing that persuaded the White House to go low key must have been its conviction that nothing would have changed the minds of its opponents in the political arena and the press.
Friday, June 30, 2006
Tuesday, June 27, 2006
Roots Of The Taleban’s Resurgence
Afghanistan has seen a dramatic increase in fighting, especially in the southern and central regions. Coalition forces and the Afghan military released a statement June 24 saying they had killed at least 65 Taliban fighters, as part of Operation Mountain Thrust.
More than 10,000 Afghan, NATO, and US forces are taking part in counter-insurgency operations in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul, the stronghold of remnants of the ousted Taleban regime. US and Afghan officials see the operation as an effort to extend the reach of the Afghan government and to expand humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.
“Operation Mountain Thrust is not about just killing and capturing extremists,” Col. Tom Collins, a US army spokesman, told reporters. “It is very much about establishing the conditions where the [Afghan] government can extend its authority into areas where it does not currently have a presence.”
Mohammed Diaoud, the governor of Helmand province, has cautioned against a resurgence of the Taleban. “It’s not as if they are all sleeping,” Diaoud told a reporter. He hastened to add that the Taleban do not “have the ability to fight against such an organized operation." Some expect the security situation to improve as NATO raises the number of troops in Afghanistan from some 9,700 to more than 15,000, mostly where insurgents are most active.
How has the enemy risen from the ashes of defeat? One reason could be that the Taleban were never defeated to the extent we have been led to believe. Pakistan’s President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has been quite selective in his support to the Bush administration’s war on terror. Islamabad has been helpful in the capture of Al Qaeda leaders and in the interception of the organization’s communications. When it comes to the Taleban, Gen. Musharraf has his limitations. The Taleban, after all, was the creation of Pakistan, an organization that was expected to bring order to the factional fighting that followed the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.
True, the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) wing recruited and trained these fighters – fresh graduates of Islamic seminaries that proliferated in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Islamabad’s backing for the Taleban was most substantial during the civilian governments of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. To get a true picture of the dynamics involved in Pakistan, the perception that Islamabad has lost its leverage in Afghanistan with the fall of the Taleban regime must be juxtaposed with the rise in the influence of New Delhi. The most democratically elected government would have a hard time bolstering cooperation with the United States against the Taleban.
Pakistan’s support alone cannot explain the Taleban’s resurgence. Reports from the field speak of younger, more aggressive commanders rising through the ranks and becoming more audacious in their tactics. They have benefited from some of the operational weaknesses among coalition forces. The British and Canadian troops who recently replaced some American forces have not yet acquired the skills of the departing soldiers.
At a broader level, the Taleban have been incorporating tactics employed by insurgents in Iraq. The increasing use of suicide bombers and the selection of high-media-value targets bear the hallmarks of the Iraqi insurgency.
Another shift seems to have occurred. Like the anti-Soviet mujahideen before them, the Taleban preferred to fight in rural areas. Warfare in the region’s rugged terrain is deeply etched in many Pashtun tribes. Recent fighting, however, has been focused in more populous areas.
The role of Al Qaeda comes into focus here. If the organization could join hands with avowedly secular Baathists in an anti-US insurgency in Iraq, Al Qaeda certainly would have fewer reasons not to back the Taleban, a wholly owned subsidiary. The precise relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taleban following the latter’s overthrow in late 2001 remains unclear. Some suggest that the leaders of the two groups have fallen out.
However, if Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri are indeed hiding somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, then it is clear they are doing so at the behest of the Taleban, who enjoy considerable support among the region’s tribals.
Finally, the Iran factor comes into play. With American forces bogged down in the Iraqi insurgency, Iran has been the principal state beneficiary. By pinning down the US military on their eastern flank as well, the mullahs in Teheran must hope to improve their leverage against the Americans on the nuclear and a raft of other issues.
More than 10,000 Afghan, NATO, and US forces are taking part in counter-insurgency operations in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul, the stronghold of remnants of the ousted Taleban regime. US and Afghan officials see the operation as an effort to extend the reach of the Afghan government and to expand humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.
“Operation Mountain Thrust is not about just killing and capturing extremists,” Col. Tom Collins, a US army spokesman, told reporters. “It is very much about establishing the conditions where the [Afghan] government can extend its authority into areas where it does not currently have a presence.”
Mohammed Diaoud, the governor of Helmand province, has cautioned against a resurgence of the Taleban. “It’s not as if they are all sleeping,” Diaoud told a reporter. He hastened to add that the Taleban do not “have the ability to fight against such an organized operation." Some expect the security situation to improve as NATO raises the number of troops in Afghanistan from some 9,700 to more than 15,000, mostly where insurgents are most active.
How has the enemy risen from the ashes of defeat? One reason could be that the Taleban were never defeated to the extent we have been led to believe. Pakistan’s President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has been quite selective in his support to the Bush administration’s war on terror. Islamabad has been helpful in the capture of Al Qaeda leaders and in the interception of the organization’s communications. When it comes to the Taleban, Gen. Musharraf has his limitations. The Taleban, after all, was the creation of Pakistan, an organization that was expected to bring order to the factional fighting that followed the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.
True, the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) wing recruited and trained these fighters – fresh graduates of Islamic seminaries that proliferated in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Islamabad’s backing for the Taleban was most substantial during the civilian governments of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. To get a true picture of the dynamics involved in Pakistan, the perception that Islamabad has lost its leverage in Afghanistan with the fall of the Taleban regime must be juxtaposed with the rise in the influence of New Delhi. The most democratically elected government would have a hard time bolstering cooperation with the United States against the Taleban.
Pakistan’s support alone cannot explain the Taleban’s resurgence. Reports from the field speak of younger, more aggressive commanders rising through the ranks and becoming more audacious in their tactics. They have benefited from some of the operational weaknesses among coalition forces. The British and Canadian troops who recently replaced some American forces have not yet acquired the skills of the departing soldiers.
At a broader level, the Taleban have been incorporating tactics employed by insurgents in Iraq. The increasing use of suicide bombers and the selection of high-media-value targets bear the hallmarks of the Iraqi insurgency.
Another shift seems to have occurred. Like the anti-Soviet mujahideen before them, the Taleban preferred to fight in rural areas. Warfare in the region’s rugged terrain is deeply etched in many Pashtun tribes. Recent fighting, however, has been focused in more populous areas.
The role of Al Qaeda comes into focus here. If the organization could join hands with avowedly secular Baathists in an anti-US insurgency in Iraq, Al Qaeda certainly would have fewer reasons not to back the Taleban, a wholly owned subsidiary. The precise relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taleban following the latter’s overthrow in late 2001 remains unclear. Some suggest that the leaders of the two groups have fallen out.
However, if Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri are indeed hiding somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, then it is clear they are doing so at the behest of the Taleban, who enjoy considerable support among the region’s tribals.
Finally, the Iran factor comes into play. With American forces bogged down in the Iraqi insurgency, Iran has been the principal state beneficiary. By pinning down the US military on their eastern flank as well, the mullahs in Teheran must hope to improve their leverage against the Americans on the nuclear and a raft of other issues.
Tuesday, June 20, 2006
Beijing To Washington Via Pyongyang?
Those with a bent for deciphering North Korea’s erratic behavior have swung into action following Pyongyang’s reported preparations for testing a long-range missile that one day may be capable of reaching the United States.
Is Kim Jong-il just jealous, as The New York Times pondered, of all the attention Iran has been getting as a result of Tehran's recent nuclear bad behavior, and craves a spotlight of its own? Or is Pyongyang merely operating on a normal defense-modernization schedule? Did the Bush administration somehow instigate this whole crisis in a new effort to justify its own missile-defense program?
Another group of Pyongyang-watchers might be tempted to dismiss such speculation, citing Kim’s personal eccentricities – some would prefer the more precise term instability. If there is any country today where one man symbolizes the state, it has to be North Korea. Where else could you find a regime bent on acquiring the most modern means of destruction while its people are starving?
The Bush administration, which believes the missile is now fully fueled and ready to go, has been warning of devastating consequences this “provocation” would inflict on North Korea.
For all its rhetoric on how 9/11 changed the world as we knew it, President Bush and his advisers are adhering to a Cold War-era arms-control doctrine. Kim knows that an American retaliation against his country – devastating as that would be -- would also destabilize South Korea and Japan and beyond. Moreover, mutual assured destruction is not a smart deterrent in an age of suicide bombers, most of who tend to be clinically sane until the very end.
Perhaps the answer lies in China, Kim’s principal -- and many believe only – ally. The Chinese have been at the forefront of the six-party talks on North Korea, winning praise from the Bush administration. In the U.N. Security Council, American diplomats know that even if they cannot get Beijing to vote with Washington, the Chinese could make things easier by abstaining.
Admittedly, U.S.-Chinese relations have undergone a remarkable upswing since the spring of 2001 when a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing in China after what officials described as a "minor" mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter jet.
The fallout was anything but minor: political and military tensions between the two countries had plunged to such depths in a generation. Of course, 9/11 and the war on terrorism brought the two countries closer. After all, China was battling its own version of Islamic separatism in the restive region of Xinjiang.
But China seems to be having second thoughts about whether the Bush administration really abandoned the neocons’ “containment” strategy. If Washington’s honeymoon with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf could end in such short notice, China’s communist leaders could not be so confident, could they?
The pointers were clear. In February, the Pentagon released its Quadrennial Defense Review, which listed, among other things, traditional threats by “near-peer” powers like China. In its annual report to Congress on China's military, the Defense Department refocused on China's growing maritime capabilities. Both virtually resurrected the “China threat.”
The resignation of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in Beijing’s view, brought the clearest indication of a hardening of the Bush administration’s posture. Zoellick, who did not give a reason for quitting, was the architect of a more engagement-based U.S. policy on China. As a “responsible stakeholder,” according to the Zoellick approach, China could cooperate globally with the United States. In fact, the two governments had created a permanent panel – which Zoellick led from the American side – to discuss global issues and events.
If Washington could revert to a pre-9/11 posture, so could Beijing. Did the Chinese leadership decide to send that message through North Korea – for added emphasis?
Is Kim Jong-il just jealous, as The New York Times pondered, of all the attention Iran has been getting as a result of Tehran's recent nuclear bad behavior, and craves a spotlight of its own? Or is Pyongyang merely operating on a normal defense-modernization schedule? Did the Bush administration somehow instigate this whole crisis in a new effort to justify its own missile-defense program?
Another group of Pyongyang-watchers might be tempted to dismiss such speculation, citing Kim’s personal eccentricities – some would prefer the more precise term instability. If there is any country today where one man symbolizes the state, it has to be North Korea. Where else could you find a regime bent on acquiring the most modern means of destruction while its people are starving?
The Bush administration, which believes the missile is now fully fueled and ready to go, has been warning of devastating consequences this “provocation” would inflict on North Korea.
For all its rhetoric on how 9/11 changed the world as we knew it, President Bush and his advisers are adhering to a Cold War-era arms-control doctrine. Kim knows that an American retaliation against his country – devastating as that would be -- would also destabilize South Korea and Japan and beyond. Moreover, mutual assured destruction is not a smart deterrent in an age of suicide bombers, most of who tend to be clinically sane until the very end.
Perhaps the answer lies in China, Kim’s principal -- and many believe only – ally. The Chinese have been at the forefront of the six-party talks on North Korea, winning praise from the Bush administration. In the U.N. Security Council, American diplomats know that even if they cannot get Beijing to vote with Washington, the Chinese could make things easier by abstaining.
Admittedly, U.S.-Chinese relations have undergone a remarkable upswing since the spring of 2001 when a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing in China after what officials described as a "minor" mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter jet.
The fallout was anything but minor: political and military tensions between the two countries had plunged to such depths in a generation. Of course, 9/11 and the war on terrorism brought the two countries closer. After all, China was battling its own version of Islamic separatism in the restive region of Xinjiang.
But China seems to be having second thoughts about whether the Bush administration really abandoned the neocons’ “containment” strategy. If Washington’s honeymoon with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf could end in such short notice, China’s communist leaders could not be so confident, could they?
The pointers were clear. In February, the Pentagon released its Quadrennial Defense Review, which listed, among other things, traditional threats by “near-peer” powers like China. In its annual report to Congress on China's military, the Defense Department refocused on China's growing maritime capabilities. Both virtually resurrected the “China threat.”
The resignation of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in Beijing’s view, brought the clearest indication of a hardening of the Bush administration’s posture. Zoellick, who did not give a reason for quitting, was the architect of a more engagement-based U.S. policy on China. As a “responsible stakeholder,” according to the Zoellick approach, China could cooperate globally with the United States. In fact, the two governments had created a permanent panel – which Zoellick led from the American side – to discuss global issues and events.
If Washington could revert to a pre-9/11 posture, so could Beijing. Did the Chinese leadership decide to send that message through North Korea – for added emphasis?
Friday, June 16, 2006
Iraq: Amnesty No Slur On Sacrifice
When Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki, a Shia, unveiled a national reconciliation policy that includes the possibility of an amnesty for sections of the predominantly Sunni insurgency, he knew he would meet stiff opposition in Washington.
With the American military’s death toll having crossed the 2,500 mark since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the “sacrifice-in-vain” argument against an amnesty is bound to gain momentum among families of the victims, their elected representatives and wider American society.
Realities on the ground offer an opportunity for more sobering thought. In the aftermath of the killing of Abu Musaub Al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the American have been reminded how the foreign jihadists represent only a portion of the insurgency that shows no sign of abating. For planners in American and Iraq alike, however, the urgency of taming the indigenous militants has always been pressing. The government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi tried to push an amnesty but succumbed to American pressure.
It might never be known how significantly the US decision to disband Saddam Hussein’s military went on to shape the insurgency. In the run-up to the invasion, the media widely quoted experts and analysts who suggested a serious risk of urban warfare by Saddam’s military once US-British forces advanced on Baghdad.
Are the insurgents members of the same divisions that melted away without a fight on the fringes of the Iraqi capital in the final days of the invasion? The time needed to find out for sure would doubtless claim more American lives. More importantly, the raging insurgency will continue to kill and maim infinitely more Iraqis.
Admittedly, Zarqawi’s departure marks a serious blow to the jihadist component of the insurgency, more so in psychological than in operational terms. It is imperative to use an amnesty to separate Iraqi nationalist insurgents from jihadists when it has the greatest chance of working. Indeed, a targeted amnesty may be Iraq’s last hope of surviving as one nation.
Zarqawi’s real legacy – the sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis – casts a more dangerous shadow on Iraq, a reality Maliki recognizes. By appointing Sunni and Shia former army officers as defense and interior ministers respectively, the new prime minister has provided a small but real opening.
If the Shias, Kurds and mainstream Sunnis are sufficiently assured that an amnesty would foster reconciliation by bringing Sunni insurgents into the political process, outsiders should not have a veto.
An Iraq steadily gaining the peace and stability required to emerge as a vibrant democracy will have been worth the enormous sacrifices Iraqis, Americans, Britons and countless others have made.
With the American military’s death toll having crossed the 2,500 mark since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the “sacrifice-in-vain” argument against an amnesty is bound to gain momentum among families of the victims, their elected representatives and wider American society.
Realities on the ground offer an opportunity for more sobering thought. In the aftermath of the killing of Abu Musaub Al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the American have been reminded how the foreign jihadists represent only a portion of the insurgency that shows no sign of abating. For planners in American and Iraq alike, however, the urgency of taming the indigenous militants has always been pressing. The government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi tried to push an amnesty but succumbed to American pressure.
It might never be known how significantly the US decision to disband Saddam Hussein’s military went on to shape the insurgency. In the run-up to the invasion, the media widely quoted experts and analysts who suggested a serious risk of urban warfare by Saddam’s military once US-British forces advanced on Baghdad.
Are the insurgents members of the same divisions that melted away without a fight on the fringes of the Iraqi capital in the final days of the invasion? The time needed to find out for sure would doubtless claim more American lives. More importantly, the raging insurgency will continue to kill and maim infinitely more Iraqis.
Admittedly, Zarqawi’s departure marks a serious blow to the jihadist component of the insurgency, more so in psychological than in operational terms. It is imperative to use an amnesty to separate Iraqi nationalist insurgents from jihadists when it has the greatest chance of working. Indeed, a targeted amnesty may be Iraq’s last hope of surviving as one nation.
Zarqawi’s real legacy – the sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis – casts a more dangerous shadow on Iraq, a reality Maliki recognizes. By appointing Sunni and Shia former army officers as defense and interior ministers respectively, the new prime minister has provided a small but real opening.
If the Shias, Kurds and mainstream Sunnis are sufficiently assured that an amnesty would foster reconciliation by bringing Sunni insurgents into the political process, outsiders should not have a veto.
An Iraq steadily gaining the peace and stability required to emerge as a vibrant democracy will have been worth the enormous sacrifices Iraqis, Americans, Britons and countless others have made.
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
China’s Year Of The Doghouse
The Year of the Dog seems to be gnawing at China’s international image with unusual ferocity. In a scathing report this week, Amnesty International accused China of stoking conflicts in Sudan, Burma and Nepal by selling arms to those regimes shunned by the rest of the world.
Striking at the basis of China’s emergence as a principal global player, the London-based human rights watchdog said: “China's arms exports, estimated to be in excess of one billion dollars a year often involve the exchange of weapons for raw materials to fuel the country's rapid economic growth.”
Such interests, according to a separate story by the Inter Press Service, has led China, a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council, to block to US efforts to impose economic and military sanctions on recalcitrant countries.
Rejecting the AI report, Beijing insists it has been exporting conventional weapons properly in the light of international rules. Teng Jianqun, a researcher with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told Xinhua news agency that China has always put its limited arms export under strict control and surveillance.
He noted that China adheres to three principles in arms trade: it should help enhance the self-defense capability of import countries, should not impair regional and global peace, security and stability, and should not be used to interfere with other countries' internal affairs.
Before the ethical dimensions of Chinese arms sales could fully settle in, Apple announced it is investigating a newspaper report that staff in some of its Chinese iPod factories work long hours for low pay and in “slave” conditions.
Britain’s Mail on Sunday newspaper alleged that workers received as little as £27 a month, doing 15-hour shifts making the iconic mp3 player. Employees at the factory lived in dormitories housing 100 people and outsiders were banned, the newspaper said. Apple said it did not tolerate its supplier code of conduct being broken. “Apple is committed to ensuring that working conditions in our supply chain are safe, workers are treated with respect and dignity, and manufacturing processes are environmentally responsible,” the company said in a statement.
Apple added it is investigating the allegations regarding working conditions in the iPod manufacturing plant in China.
Could there be a broader agenda at work here? The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the world of its principal bogeyman (although some would still say an “inspiration”.)
The new baddies – Baathist Iraq, Iran, North Korea, for instance – couldn’t rise to the level of the Soviet threat that kept the world on its toes. Among many, nostalgia for the Cold War set in deep. In light of subsequent events, many must have wondered, might an Afghanistan Soviet Socialist Republic have done more for regional and even global security?
The idea of a grand alliance of disparate groups behind the demonization of China is not as far-fetched as it sounds. The steep rise in gas prices? Blame the booming Chinese middle class. Criticism of increased military spending on conventional threats in the midst of our new kind of war (on terror)? Point to Taiwan. Economic instability? Ah, those clever currency manipulators in Beijing.
The enduring moral of the Cold War: Make sure you always have someone else you can blame for when things go wrong.
Striking at the basis of China’s emergence as a principal global player, the London-based human rights watchdog said: “China's arms exports, estimated to be in excess of one billion dollars a year often involve the exchange of weapons for raw materials to fuel the country's rapid economic growth.”
Such interests, according to a separate story by the Inter Press Service, has led China, a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council, to block to US efforts to impose economic and military sanctions on recalcitrant countries.
Rejecting the AI report, Beijing insists it has been exporting conventional weapons properly in the light of international rules. Teng Jianqun, a researcher with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told Xinhua news agency that China has always put its limited arms export under strict control and surveillance.
He noted that China adheres to three principles in arms trade: it should help enhance the self-defense capability of import countries, should not impair regional and global peace, security and stability, and should not be used to interfere with other countries' internal affairs.
Before the ethical dimensions of Chinese arms sales could fully settle in, Apple announced it is investigating a newspaper report that staff in some of its Chinese iPod factories work long hours for low pay and in “slave” conditions.
Britain’s Mail on Sunday newspaper alleged that workers received as little as £27 a month, doing 15-hour shifts making the iconic mp3 player. Employees at the factory lived in dormitories housing 100 people and outsiders were banned, the newspaper said. Apple said it did not tolerate its supplier code of conduct being broken. “Apple is committed to ensuring that working conditions in our supply chain are safe, workers are treated with respect and dignity, and manufacturing processes are environmentally responsible,” the company said in a statement.
Apple added it is investigating the allegations regarding working conditions in the iPod manufacturing plant in China.
Could there be a broader agenda at work here? The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the world of its principal bogeyman (although some would still say an “inspiration”.)
The new baddies – Baathist Iraq, Iran, North Korea, for instance – couldn’t rise to the level of the Soviet threat that kept the world on its toes. Among many, nostalgia for the Cold War set in deep. In light of subsequent events, many must have wondered, might an Afghanistan Soviet Socialist Republic have done more for regional and even global security?
The idea of a grand alliance of disparate groups behind the demonization of China is not as far-fetched as it sounds. The steep rise in gas prices? Blame the booming Chinese middle class. Criticism of increased military spending on conventional threats in the midst of our new kind of war (on terror)? Point to Taiwan. Economic instability? Ah, those clever currency manipulators in Beijing.
The enduring moral of the Cold War: Make sure you always have someone else you can blame for when things go wrong.
Monday, June 12, 2006
President Garcia Confronts A Polarized Society
For many in Washington, the temptation to portray Peru’s recent presidential election as less a victory for Alan Garcia and more a defeat for Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez will persist. The prospect of another domino falling into the Venezuela-Cuba-Bolivia league had kept the Bush administration on its toes.
By returning to power after a gap of 16 years in a second round run-off against Ollanta Humala, a former army officer, the 57-year-old Garcia evidently feels vindicated. His first term in office, between 1985 and 1990 was a fiasco.
With corruption charges persistently hovering over him, Garcia’s rule saw Peru going bankrupt. Inflation skyrocketed as the currency nosedived exacerbating the economic pain of large segments of the population. This helped the Maoist Shining Path guerrillas to expand its influence across the country.
If Peruvians have given the social democratic leader another chance, they have done so with the primary intention of denying Humala power.
During the campaign, Garcia tried hard to show Peruvians that he had matured in the intervening years. Surely, he will be careful not to repeat the mistakes of his first term.
But his task is compounded by the fact that he has to govern a splintered society.
Garcia has acknowledged this reality by promising a broad government staffed by officials drawn from a wide spectrum of parties and political tendencies. There is a flip side to a unity government: the polarization of Peruvian society will have moved into his administration to paralyze decision making.
Although he lost, Humala carried 14 of Peru's 24 administrative regions and swept his stronghold in the southern highlands, where the country's poor and indigenous population is concentrated, receiving 80 percent of the votes. Simply put, he retains the ability to politicize Peru's disadvantaged and mobilize them into a cohesive group.
One thing going for Garcia is his pro-US policies and good neighborly attitude. Befriending Washington as well as moderate leftwing governments in Chile and Brazil would remain the principal tenet of his foreign policy.
For most Peruvians, Garcia will have to produce results closer to home. The new president needs massive investment, particularly from the United States, to harness his country’s vast natural resources and to ensure a profitable market for exports.
Garcia’s victory saved the recently negotiated Peru-US trade accord. How far Washington chooses to go toward rewarding that achievement would determine the momentum the second Garcia administration ends up acquiring in the weeks and months ahead.
By returning to power after a gap of 16 years in a second round run-off against Ollanta Humala, a former army officer, the 57-year-old Garcia evidently feels vindicated. His first term in office, between 1985 and 1990 was a fiasco.
With corruption charges persistently hovering over him, Garcia’s rule saw Peru going bankrupt. Inflation skyrocketed as the currency nosedived exacerbating the economic pain of large segments of the population. This helped the Maoist Shining Path guerrillas to expand its influence across the country.
If Peruvians have given the social democratic leader another chance, they have done so with the primary intention of denying Humala power.
During the campaign, Garcia tried hard to show Peruvians that he had matured in the intervening years. Surely, he will be careful not to repeat the mistakes of his first term.
But his task is compounded by the fact that he has to govern a splintered society.
Garcia has acknowledged this reality by promising a broad government staffed by officials drawn from a wide spectrum of parties and political tendencies. There is a flip side to a unity government: the polarization of Peruvian society will have moved into his administration to paralyze decision making.
Although he lost, Humala carried 14 of Peru's 24 administrative regions and swept his stronghold in the southern highlands, where the country's poor and indigenous population is concentrated, receiving 80 percent of the votes. Simply put, he retains the ability to politicize Peru's disadvantaged and mobilize them into a cohesive group.
One thing going for Garcia is his pro-US policies and good neighborly attitude. Befriending Washington as well as moderate leftwing governments in Chile and Brazil would remain the principal tenet of his foreign policy.
For most Peruvians, Garcia will have to produce results closer to home. The new president needs massive investment, particularly from the United States, to harness his country’s vast natural resources and to ensure a profitable market for exports.
Garcia’s victory saved the recently negotiated Peru-US trade accord. How far Washington chooses to go toward rewarding that achievement would determine the momentum the second Garcia administration ends up acquiring in the weeks and months ahead.
Thursday, June 08, 2006
Follow The Hawala Trail
How could Abu Musaub Al Zarqawi’s head – bloated alright -- be found in one piece amid the rubble left by two 500-lb bombs? His remains, we were told, were identified by sight and by finger-prints. So the tip of at least one of his fingers was intact.
Who’s going to pocket the $25 million bounty on the self-proclaimed leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq? More importantly, who turned him in?
Whoever had the most to lose from al-Zarqawi alive. Iraqis, Americans, Muslims from other countries were victims of the Jordanian terrorist who shot to prominence with the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003. That attack, which claimed the top UN official responsible for Iraq and dozens others, marked the onset of the insurgency.
Zarqawi’s death was undoubtedly a huge psychological victory over the insurgents. But, as President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and top Iraqi officials insisted, Zarqawi’s death does not diminish the threat he posed alive.
A lanky bearded fellow huddled somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was troubled by Zarqawi’s transformation from a small-time radical into one of the world’s most feared men.
Here was a fighter who was always at the front – actually multiple fronts -- not sermonizing from some cave or crevasse once in a while. Equally at ease with IEDs and the Internet, Zarqawi was constantly seeking to innovate. He had acquired such mythical standing among his adversaries that his clumsiness with that rifle didn’t detract from his legend.
Clearly, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri were more than troubled by Zarqawi rise. They feared him as a potential rival with multitudes of radicals behind him ready to kill or die for the cause. The Al Qaeda top brass just couldn’t find a good reason to discredit Zarqawi. True, the way he fanned Shia-Sunni violence spilled too much Muslim blood in a war that was officially against the infidels. Before Bin Laden could condemn Zarqawi’s methods, he recognized how powerfully they worked. After all, killing yourself and your co-religionists for the larger good was sanctioned under jihad.
Iraqi and American military officials have said the plan to kill Zarqawi was the culmination of weeks of sifting through tips and tracking down credible leaders. It generally takes bin Laden several weeks to deliver his tapes to Al Jazeera. Maybe the Al Qaeda leader used a similar channel of couriers to order his lieutenants to liquidate Zarqawi.
While we’re at it, maybe that last tape from bin Laden contained a coded message to loyalists to lead the American and Iraqi forces to Zarqawi and then commiserate in his “martyrdom”. It won’t hurt to start following the hawala trail for signs of some of that $25 million.
Who’s going to pocket the $25 million bounty on the self-proclaimed leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq? More importantly, who turned him in?
Whoever had the most to lose from al-Zarqawi alive. Iraqis, Americans, Muslims from other countries were victims of the Jordanian terrorist who shot to prominence with the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003. That attack, which claimed the top UN official responsible for Iraq and dozens others, marked the onset of the insurgency.
Zarqawi’s death was undoubtedly a huge psychological victory over the insurgents. But, as President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and top Iraqi officials insisted, Zarqawi’s death does not diminish the threat he posed alive.
A lanky bearded fellow huddled somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was troubled by Zarqawi’s transformation from a small-time radical into one of the world’s most feared men.
Here was a fighter who was always at the front – actually multiple fronts -- not sermonizing from some cave or crevasse once in a while. Equally at ease with IEDs and the Internet, Zarqawi was constantly seeking to innovate. He had acquired such mythical standing among his adversaries that his clumsiness with that rifle didn’t detract from his legend.
Clearly, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri were more than troubled by Zarqawi rise. They feared him as a potential rival with multitudes of radicals behind him ready to kill or die for the cause. The Al Qaeda top brass just couldn’t find a good reason to discredit Zarqawi. True, the way he fanned Shia-Sunni violence spilled too much Muslim blood in a war that was officially against the infidels. Before Bin Laden could condemn Zarqawi’s methods, he recognized how powerfully they worked. After all, killing yourself and your co-religionists for the larger good was sanctioned under jihad.
Iraqi and American military officials have said the plan to kill Zarqawi was the culmination of weeks of sifting through tips and tracking down credible leaders. It generally takes bin Laden several weeks to deliver his tapes to Al Jazeera. Maybe the Al Qaeda leader used a similar channel of couriers to order his lieutenants to liquidate Zarqawi.
While we’re at it, maybe that last tape from bin Laden contained a coded message to loyalists to lead the American and Iraqi forces to Zarqawi and then commiserate in his “martyrdom”. It won’t hurt to start following the hawala trail for signs of some of that $25 million.
Wednesday, June 07, 2006
Making Somalia Too Dangerous For Al Qaeda
The faint possibility of a diplomatic solution to the crisis over
During the waning weeks of the first Bush administration, the
After American forces sustained heavy casualties in a fierce operation in
After 9/11,
After longtime ruler Mohammed Siad Barre was toppled in a coup in 1991,
Militias belonging to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) started battling an alliance of warlords in the south, leading to hundreds of deaths.
The UIC proposes Islam as a way to bring unity to
The scars immortalized in Black Hawk Down, coupled with the quagmire in
Because of its geographical location,
Stepped-up American support for the rival warlords might seem ill-advised, considering what
Sunday, June 04, 2006
Let’s Not Glorify The Gulag
In the post-World War II military history of the United States, the reflexive presumption of guilt some Americans have vis-à-vis the brave men and women in uniform will surely stand out as a principal unvanquished adversary.
Exotic proper nouns like My Lai, Abu Ghraib and, now, Haditha have become metaphors for the brutality American strength is capable of unleashing. War has always been ugly. And it gotten uglier as the enemy has become obscurers. Roadside bombs, snipers aiming from residential areas, rockets fired from donkey carts have replaced missile silos, elite battalions and bomb shelters as searchable targets. The world’s most advanced fighting force is contending with warriors whose defenses are as unsuspecting as the channels of detestation.
Even before the official enquiry has gained pace, the details of what happened in Haditha on November 19 last year are graphic. A four-Humvee convoy of US marines from Kilo company was patrolling the town. A white taxi drew near. Marines signaled for it to stop. A bomb exploded beneath the fourth Humvee, killing its driver.
What happened next? The American soldiers said 15 civilians were killed in the explosion along with the driver. Someone then started shooting at the US soldiers, who returned fire, killing eight insurgents.
A Time magazine investigation published in March, however, found evidence of a massacre. Witnesses claim that the Americans were not fired on. Worse, the civilians who died that day – as many as 24 -- were murdered by the marines.
The Americans ordered five occupants of the white taxi, whom they may have suspected of involvement in the bombing, to lie down. They ran away instead, and the marines shot them. Then, some of the marines allegedly burst into nearby houses and killed 19 more people, only one of whom had a gun. The dead reportedly included eight women, a child and an elderly man in a wheelchair.
When President Bush ordered the invasion and occupation of Iraq, citing, among other things, the murderous nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the White House set for itself a higher standard. Americans are justified in expecting their military to follow a more civilized set of rules. Without Time’s expose, the world might not have learned of the tragedy. Americans still do not know how high up the Marine Corps chain of command the original cover-up went. How did the president, the defense secretary and other
top officials respond when they first learned of the false reporting.
Americans need to be told what steps are now being taken, besides remedial ethics training, to make sure that such crimes against civilians and such deliberate falsifications of the record do not recur.
The media must maintain sufficient vigilance on this story, in the face of competing ones, so that the investigation is transparent and the legal course – if any is required – reaches its logical conclusion.
Jumping to conclusions before all the facts are out does not serve any useful purposes. Comparing Guantanamo Bay with the Soviet Gulag, moreover, is tantamount to absolving Stalin and his henchmen of their worst excesses. Americans expect their politicians to be better than that, even in an election year.
Exotic proper nouns like My Lai, Abu Ghraib and, now, Haditha have become metaphors for the brutality American strength is capable of unleashing. War has always been ugly. And it gotten uglier as the enemy has become obscurers. Roadside bombs, snipers aiming from residential areas, rockets fired from donkey carts have replaced missile silos, elite battalions and bomb shelters as searchable targets. The world’s most advanced fighting force is contending with warriors whose defenses are as unsuspecting as the channels of detestation.
Even before the official enquiry has gained pace, the details of what happened in Haditha on November 19 last year are graphic. A four-Humvee convoy of US marines from Kilo company was patrolling the town. A white taxi drew near. Marines signaled for it to stop. A bomb exploded beneath the fourth Humvee, killing its driver.
What happened next? The American soldiers said 15 civilians were killed in the explosion along with the driver. Someone then started shooting at the US soldiers, who returned fire, killing eight insurgents.
A Time magazine investigation published in March, however, found evidence of a massacre. Witnesses claim that the Americans were not fired on. Worse, the civilians who died that day – as many as 24 -- were murdered by the marines.
The Americans ordered five occupants of the white taxi, whom they may have suspected of involvement in the bombing, to lie down. They ran away instead, and the marines shot them. Then, some of the marines allegedly burst into nearby houses and killed 19 more people, only one of whom had a gun. The dead reportedly included eight women, a child and an elderly man in a wheelchair.
When President Bush ordered the invasion and occupation of Iraq, citing, among other things, the murderous nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the White House set for itself a higher standard. Americans are justified in expecting their military to follow a more civilized set of rules. Without Time’s expose, the world might not have learned of the tragedy. Americans still do not know how high up the Marine Corps chain of command the original cover-up went. How did the president, the defense secretary and other
top officials respond when they first learned of the false reporting.
Americans need to be told what steps are now being taken, besides remedial ethics training, to make sure that such crimes against civilians and such deliberate falsifications of the record do not recur.
The media must maintain sufficient vigilance on this story, in the face of competing ones, so that the investigation is transparent and the legal course – if any is required – reaches its logical conclusion.
Jumping to conclusions before all the facts are out does not serve any useful purposes. Comparing Guantanamo Bay with the Soviet Gulag, moreover, is tantamount to absolving Stalin and his henchmen of their worst excesses. Americans expect their politicians to be better than that, even in an election year.
Thursday, June 01, 2006
Why Would Iran Want To Talk?
Just as the skeptics were saying all along, Iran has taken the United States for another ride. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Thursday his government was open to talks with the United States on his country’s nuclear program, but he rejected the U.S. precondition that it must quit enriching uranium first.
Mottaki was responding to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who said the previous day that the United States would be willing to talk with Iran if it suspended its uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
The U.S. offer to negotiate was seen as a major policy shift. Washington has had no high-level talks with Teheran for more than 25 years. The two countries formally broke off relations in 1980, after the seizure of the American embassy in the Iranian capital in 1979.
Many in the United States have faulted America’s systematic isolation of Iran – once a famously staunch American ally with a proud civilization -- for the escalation of tensions. If the mullahs went on the warpath, it was only because of the strong support successive U.S. administrations of both parties provided the Shah’s brutal dictatorship which the Islamic Revolution overthrew.
So the Bush administration got a rare round of applause from leading newspaper editorials for demonstrating “maturity.” Lost in the exultation was the fact that it was Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who first broached the issue of direct talks, not the other way around.
Bush, for his part, appeared to exude a sense of vindication. Teheran’s repudiation, after all, proved that critics of his administration’s hard stance against Iran were wrong. At the end of a cabinet meeting, the U.S. president conceded that it remained to be seen if Iran's seemingly-negative response to the proposal was its last word on the subject.
Bush had enough cover to revert to his characteristic toughness. Foreign ministers of the five permanent U.N. Security Council member countries and Germany, meeting in Vienna, reached agreement on a package of incentives for Iran to halt sensitive nuclear activities, or penalties if it refuses. The offer will now be formally conveyed to Iran.
The so-called "carrots and sticks" package would offer Iran a set of financial and technology incentives if it ended uranium enrichment and returned to nuclear negotiations with Britain, France and Germany. If it refuses, there would be U.N. Security Council action against Iran and escalating sanctions.
But isn’t there a simpler question here? Why should Iran feel the urgency to hold direct talks with the United States when it has the stick of the resurgent Shias next door in Iraq to wield against Washington? And who knows? Mullah Omar of the Taleban may be the latest beneficiary of Teheran’s oil-generated largesse, considering the seriousness the anti-American insurgency has acquired in Afghanistan, another neighbor.
Moreover, each time Ahmadinejad threatens to nuke Israel off the map, he send oil prices shooting up a couple of dollars. That kind of cash inflow would goad Teheran to widen its gaze for potential allies against America, not grovel before the Great Satan it believes it can bog down across its eastern and western borders.
Mottaki was responding to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who said the previous day that the United States would be willing to talk with Iran if it suspended its uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
The U.S. offer to negotiate was seen as a major policy shift. Washington has had no high-level talks with Teheran for more than 25 years. The two countries formally broke off relations in 1980, after the seizure of the American embassy in the Iranian capital in 1979.
Many in the United States have faulted America’s systematic isolation of Iran – once a famously staunch American ally with a proud civilization -- for the escalation of tensions. If the mullahs went on the warpath, it was only because of the strong support successive U.S. administrations of both parties provided the Shah’s brutal dictatorship which the Islamic Revolution overthrew.
So the Bush administration got a rare round of applause from leading newspaper editorials for demonstrating “maturity.” Lost in the exultation was the fact that it was Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who first broached the issue of direct talks, not the other way around.
Bush, for his part, appeared to exude a sense of vindication. Teheran’s repudiation, after all, proved that critics of his administration’s hard stance against Iran were wrong. At the end of a cabinet meeting, the U.S. president conceded that it remained to be seen if Iran's seemingly-negative response to the proposal was its last word on the subject.
Bush had enough cover to revert to his characteristic toughness. Foreign ministers of the five permanent U.N. Security Council member countries and Germany, meeting in Vienna, reached agreement on a package of incentives for Iran to halt sensitive nuclear activities, or penalties if it refuses. The offer will now be formally conveyed to Iran.
The so-called "carrots and sticks" package would offer Iran a set of financial and technology incentives if it ended uranium enrichment and returned to nuclear negotiations with Britain, France and Germany. If it refuses, there would be U.N. Security Council action against Iran and escalating sanctions.
But isn’t there a simpler question here? Why should Iran feel the urgency to hold direct talks with the United States when it has the stick of the resurgent Shias next door in Iraq to wield against Washington? And who knows? Mullah Omar of the Taleban may be the latest beneficiary of Teheran’s oil-generated largesse, considering the seriousness the anti-American insurgency has acquired in Afghanistan, another neighbor.
Moreover, each time Ahmadinejad threatens to nuke Israel off the map, he send oil prices shooting up a couple of dollars. That kind of cash inflow would goad Teheran to widen its gaze for potential allies against America, not grovel before the Great Satan it believes it can bog down across its eastern and western borders.
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