Mauling Musharraf

The flurry of American pronouncements on Pakistan indicates that Washington seems to be seriously envisaging a policy that looks beyond President Pervez Musharraf. At a news conference in Islamabad this week, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher said Washington would like to see Pakistan’s military come under civilian control.
After President George W. Bush pressed the democracy message during his visit to Pakistan last month – to the palpable discomfort of his host -- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley have gone to considerable lengths to reinforce it.
Clearly, these statements can be expected to galvanize Musharraf’s opponents dispersed across the political spectrum. Although presidential elections are not due until late next year, a burgeoning anti-Musharraf movement could culminate in an early vote.
What has propelled Washington to publicly maintain a distance from a man it considered an indispensable ally until recently?
Admittedly, Musharraf’s political fortunes soared with the 9/11 attacks. After the army chief overthrew prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s government in October 1999 and gave Pakistan its fourth military regime, Musharraf had remained a pariah. Although President Bill Clinton stopped over in Pakistan for six hours during his South Asia trip in 2000, Musharraf was virtually shunned by the rest of the world.
The post-9/11 campaign to oust the Taleban regime in Afghanistan raised Pakistan’s stature as a principal U.S. ally. Over time, Musharraf’s vision of “enlightened moderation” in Islam provided a convenient basis for Washington to articulate its other concerns.
Pakistan’s major political parties, dogged by allegations of corruption and inefficiency, were considered unviable. With Islamists gaining political clout, Musharraf was the only man Washington considered capable of holding Pakistan together. The very thought of Musharraf’s exit seemed unbearable. Assassination attempts on the Pakistani leader sparked dread in Washington.
What has changed? Does the Bush administration believe it no longer needs Musharraf in its fight against radical Islam? Is Washington sufficiently assured that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe from the Islamist groups poised to take over? Or have Pakistan’s two major political formations – the People’s Party of Benazir Bhutto and Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif – earned enough credibility in American eyes as bulwarks against Islamists?
The ground realities vis-à-vis Pakistan’s vulnerability to a radical Islamist takeover do not seem to have changed drastically enough to warrant such a serious U.S. policy shift. Has the Bush administration decided to dump Musharraf anyway?
Many in Washington, after all, believe he is the principal reason America hasn’t been able to catch Osama bin Laden. Over the years, the Pakistani leader himself has offered contradictory information on the Al Qaeda leader’s status. Musharraf once sounded reasonably confident that Bin Laden was dead. Of late, has been insisting that the region the U.S. believes the Al Qaeda leader is hiding in has long been out of the direct control of the Pakistani government.
Does the policy shift stem primarily from a consensus in the Bush administration that Musharraf might be using Bin Laden as an insurance policy? In that case, the Bush administration must be relying on other assurances.
Has India reassured the United States of its ability to intervene military to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and prevent a jihadist takeover?