AS PART of its largest peace mission ever, the United Nations on Sunday oversaw one of the world’s most ambitious experiments in democracy. Millions of eager voters lined up outside schools and community centers across the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly known as Zaire, to elect a president and parliamentary representatives.
The run-up to the DRC’s first multiparty election in over 40 years was gripped by fears of an upsurge in violence. After all, until four years ago, the DRC was a battleground for domestic armies as well as soldiers from a half-dozen other African countries.
Although the war has formally ended, thousands of rebels and soldiers continue to terrorize the people. The transitional government, comprising former warring factions, was dysfunctional. The former rebel armies continue to pillage and feud over control of mines and other resources in the country the size of Western Europe.
However, fears of mass attacks on polling stations proved unwarranted. There were isolated attacks on the electoral commission in East and West Kasai provinces, strongholds of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress, which boycotted the polls. A voting station was set on fire the night before the polls. After the balloting ended, rampaging youths in one town destroyed 52 polling stations.
In the end, as the Israeli-Hezbollah fighting grabbed the international spotlight, DRC voters took another bold step to end a war in which nearly 4 million may have died. International institutions played an impressive role. The U.N. force numbers 17,500, and its election administration has spent more than $400 million raised from international donors. The European Union, which provided much of that funding, dispatched its own force of 2,000 to help with security.
There is palpable apprehension inside the DRC and abroad that the world is using the election to ratify the rule of President Joseph Kabila, who has served since his father, Laurent, was assassinated in 2001. In this heated atmosphere, armed factions that stand to lose power may trigger fresh violence. Ominous sounds are already being heard. Three of the DRC’s vice-presidents, including two former rebel leaders, challenged Kabila. If the losers are unwilling to accept the results of this round of voting the DRC could find itself in a new spiral of violence.
Even if a clear and unchallenged winner emerges, the international community cannot afford to pull out of the DRC and hop into the next crisis zone. The country needs a sustained campaign to reform and train the other tools of statecraft – the bureaucracy, judiciary, army and its newly elected legislators. With so much invested in the peace process and so much promise already evident, the DRC project must be followed through to its logical end.
Monday, July 31, 2006
Thursday, July 27, 2006
Al Zawahiri Again. Where’s Bin Laden?
The most striking aspect of Al Qaeda’s deputy leader Ayman Al Zawahiri’s latest video broadcast is its relative freshness. It took only two weeks after Israel began its attacks on Lebanon and Gaza for Al Zawahiri to warn, via the Arabic satellite TV channel Al Jazeera, of a massive response.
Al Qaeda could not remain silent in the face of a “Crusader war,” Al Zawahiri states, adding that it saw “all the world as a battlefield open in front of us.” Events in Lebanon and Gaza showed the importance of the battle in Afghanistan and Iraq, he added.
More revealing is the following: “The war with Israel is not about a treaty, a ceasefire agreement... It is rather a jihad for the sake of God until the religion of God is established. It is jihad for the liberation of Palestine, all of Palestine, as well as every land that was a home for Islam, from Andalusia to Iraq.”
Clearly, the tenor of the text suggests that it was written after the scale and severity of the Israeli attacks triggered international calls for a ceasefire – which makes the video even newer.
Over the past two years, Al Zawahiri has released many his statements in the form of videos. His boss, Osama bin Laden, uses audio statements. Does this mean Al Zawahiri has a greater ability to move around?
On the other hand, could bin Laden’s reliance on old video or still pictures suggest that his appearance has declined lately? If so, he certainly would not want to give the impression of weakness or infirmity to the faithful. Or is the Al Qaeda chief relying on the audio format to reduce the chances of Western intelligence tracking his location?
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda tapes, once recorded, ostensibly had to cross a complicated distribution network. The obvious risks inherent in physically transporting the tapes to a broadcast outlet may have delayed their eventual transmission. More recently, Al Qaeda appears to have chosen to transmit its tapes directly via the Internet. The easy availability of equipment, coupled with improvements in high-speed access, may have assured faster dissemination of audio and video.
But if these technological advances have worked for Al Zawahiri, couldn’t they do the same for bin Laden?
Furthermore, the Al Qaeda chief might have considered issuing this particular statement himself, especially considering the firmness with which his organization has underscored the international dimensions of jihad.
Or maybe bin Laden has undergone plastic surgery or any other such alteration in his physical appearance to avoid detection – in which case a video appearance would make little sense.
Al Qaeda could not remain silent in the face of a “Crusader war,” Al Zawahiri states, adding that it saw “all the world as a battlefield open in front of us.” Events in Lebanon and Gaza showed the importance of the battle in Afghanistan and Iraq, he added.
More revealing is the following: “The war with Israel is not about a treaty, a ceasefire agreement... It is rather a jihad for the sake of God until the religion of God is established. It is jihad for the liberation of Palestine, all of Palestine, as well as every land that was a home for Islam, from Andalusia to Iraq.”
Clearly, the tenor of the text suggests that it was written after the scale and severity of the Israeli attacks triggered international calls for a ceasefire – which makes the video even newer.
Over the past two years, Al Zawahiri has released many his statements in the form of videos. His boss, Osama bin Laden, uses audio statements. Does this mean Al Zawahiri has a greater ability to move around?
On the other hand, could bin Laden’s reliance on old video or still pictures suggest that his appearance has declined lately? If so, he certainly would not want to give the impression of weakness or infirmity to the faithful. Or is the Al Qaeda chief relying on the audio format to reduce the chances of Western intelligence tracking his location?
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda tapes, once recorded, ostensibly had to cross a complicated distribution network. The obvious risks inherent in physically transporting the tapes to a broadcast outlet may have delayed their eventual transmission. More recently, Al Qaeda appears to have chosen to transmit its tapes directly via the Internet. The easy availability of equipment, coupled with improvements in high-speed access, may have assured faster dissemination of audio and video.
But if these technological advances have worked for Al Zawahiri, couldn’t they do the same for bin Laden?
Furthermore, the Al Qaeda chief might have considered issuing this particular statement himself, especially considering the firmness with which his organization has underscored the international dimensions of jihad.
Or maybe bin Laden has undergone plastic surgery or any other such alteration in his physical appearance to avoid detection – in which case a video appearance would make little sense.
Tuesday, July 25, 2006
Royal Thai Democracy
THAIS have once again had the opportunity to reflect on their good fortune in the person of King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The world’s longest reigning monarch has ended a long spell of political uncertainty by setting new elections for October 15.
Bhumibol, a constitutional monarch in the truest sense, emerged to end the political impasse created by the outgoing prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The expensive snap poll Thaksin held three months ago had been invalidated by Thailand’s constitutional court, casting a shadow on the country’s political future.
To be sure, Thaksin’s decision to seek a fresh mandate fell within his constitutional prerogative. A huge corruption scandal involving the premier and his family had fueled months of street protests against his policies.
As a democratically elected premier, Thaksin had every right to hold the April 2 elections, since governing had increasingly become difficult. Moreover, the protests consuming the Thai capital and other urban centers could not obscure the massive support Thaksin continues to enjoy in countryside.
Much time, money and political capital could have been saved had the opposition parties participated in the snap elections and campaigned to defeat Thaksin. But the Democrat, Chart Thai and Mahachon Parties boycotted the election, arguing that it was unfairly set to favor the prime minister.
Although his Thai Rak Thai Party won the election, Thaksin had to step down under the combined pressure of an incomplete mandate and continuing opposition protests.
Since then the country has been plunged into a political stalemate for months, without a functioning parliament and run by a caretaker government. The king had asked the nation's top three courts to work out a solution for the crisis.
While the subversion of the democratic process was undoubtedly a source of much concern, the fact that political developments could take their own course under a sagacious monarch testifies to the maturity Thailand’s democracy has attained.
Until the early 1990s, Thailand’s military – with its long record of coups and other acts of direct political interference – was capable of stepping into the vacuum democrats had created.
The new elections are an opportunity for Thailand’s political parties to make a clean break from their record of squabbling. Thais can continue to rely on the monarchy’s wisdom to sail through crises. But they do expect their politicians to exhibit the commitment and resolve needed to consolidate the democratic process.
Bhumibol, a constitutional monarch in the truest sense, emerged to end the political impasse created by the outgoing prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The expensive snap poll Thaksin held three months ago had been invalidated by Thailand’s constitutional court, casting a shadow on the country’s political future.
To be sure, Thaksin’s decision to seek a fresh mandate fell within his constitutional prerogative. A huge corruption scandal involving the premier and his family had fueled months of street protests against his policies.
As a democratically elected premier, Thaksin had every right to hold the April 2 elections, since governing had increasingly become difficult. Moreover, the protests consuming the Thai capital and other urban centers could not obscure the massive support Thaksin continues to enjoy in countryside.
Much time, money and political capital could have been saved had the opposition parties participated in the snap elections and campaigned to defeat Thaksin. But the Democrat, Chart Thai and Mahachon Parties boycotted the election, arguing that it was unfairly set to favor the prime minister.
Although his Thai Rak Thai Party won the election, Thaksin had to step down under the combined pressure of an incomplete mandate and continuing opposition protests.
Since then the country has been plunged into a political stalemate for months, without a functioning parliament and run by a caretaker government. The king had asked the nation's top three courts to work out a solution for the crisis.
While the subversion of the democratic process was undoubtedly a source of much concern, the fact that political developments could take their own course under a sagacious monarch testifies to the maturity Thailand’s democracy has attained.
Until the early 1990s, Thailand’s military – with its long record of coups and other acts of direct political interference – was capable of stepping into the vacuum democrats had created.
The new elections are an opportunity for Thailand’s political parties to make a clean break from their record of squabbling. Thais can continue to rely on the monarchy’s wisdom to sail through crises. But they do expect their politicians to exhibit the commitment and resolve needed to consolidate the democratic process.
Saturday, July 22, 2006
Condi’s Element Of Surprise
Clearly, the rest of the world seems to believe Israel’s disproportionate response to the Hezbollah-Hamas kidnappings is President George W. Bush’s fault. The real bad news is that the White House seems to believe that, too.
President Bush has decided to dispatch Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to convey Washington’s interest in scaling down the conflict. Not to the extent, though, of forcing Israel to declare a unilateral ceasefire. This is wise.
Equally prudent is the Bush administration’s move to present Rice’s journey as a prelude to her visit to Rome where she will meet with Arab officials at an international conference on Lebanon.
The obvious question: If a ceasefire or any similar initiative is off Rice’s agenda, then why bother to visit the region at all. The element of surprise.
Admittedly, Israel and the United States have been closely coordinating efforts to give the Israeli military sufficient time to carry out their offensive against Hezbollah.
What Rice’s visit would do is create the perception of active U.S. engagement. This might seem disingenuous to the president’s critics. But it is a brilliant way of discouraging other entities from stepping in. Once Israel achieves its military objectives against Hezbollah, it could be expected to goad the Bush administration toward formulating a cease-fire.
Hezbollah is banking on its ability to spring surprises on Israel and the United States. But every move is directed from Damascus and Teheran. If Condi can leave the Iranians, Syrians and the Hezbollah equally baffled over what American might be up to next, we’re all for it.
President Bush has decided to dispatch Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to convey Washington’s interest in scaling down the conflict. Not to the extent, though, of forcing Israel to declare a unilateral ceasefire. This is wise.
Equally prudent is the Bush administration’s move to present Rice’s journey as a prelude to her visit to Rome where she will meet with Arab officials at an international conference on Lebanon.
The obvious question: If a ceasefire or any similar initiative is off Rice’s agenda, then why bother to visit the region at all. The element of surprise.
Admittedly, Israel and the United States have been closely coordinating efforts to give the Israeli military sufficient time to carry out their offensive against Hezbollah.
What Rice’s visit would do is create the perception of active U.S. engagement. This might seem disingenuous to the president’s critics. But it is a brilliant way of discouraging other entities from stepping in. Once Israel achieves its military objectives against Hezbollah, it could be expected to goad the Bush administration toward formulating a cease-fire.
Hezbollah is banking on its ability to spring surprises on Israel and the United States. But every move is directed from Damascus and Teheran. If Condi can leave the Iranians, Syrians and the Hezbollah equally baffled over what American might be up to next, we’re all for it.
Wednesday, July 19, 2006
Bush’s 1st Veto: Good Economics, Better Ethics
For the first time in his five-year-old presidency, George W. Bush has used his veto – against federal funding for stem-cell research. How could something that enjoyed wide support from Democrats and Republicans finally break Bush’s reluctance to use a prerogative previous presidents have employed with abandon.
Moreover, which part of the debate forced Bush to describe the Senate vote as having “crossed a moral boundary?
Supporters claim stem cells can turn into any kind of cell in the body and may prove to be
extremely useful medically, for example in the treatment of Parkinson’s disease, spinal-cord injuries and Alzheimer’s. They argue that the most promising research into such cells has come from using human embryos. Now that infuriates the religious right.
Bush has said he would allow federal funding for research only on already existing colonies, or “lines”, of embryonic stem cells. By a large margin—63 to 37—senators voted to expand federal funding for research on new lines.
Several prominent Republicans supported the bill, which passed 63- to 27. Majority leader Bill Frist, a medical doctor, and John McCain, both seen as presidential candidates in 2008, were for the bill.
The politics are clear. Opinion polls suggest that stem-cell research is popular. So the Democrats are virtually united in the matter. In the GOP, too, strong alliances have been forged. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger joined Nancy Reagan, who watched her husband suffer from Alzheimer’s disease, were united in asking the president to sign the bill.
Did Bush – rumbling along the final years of his presidency – veto the bill merely because he felt he could afford to dispense with political considerations? Or was his move intended to bolster the Republicans’ image ahead of November’s midterm poll. Americans would be more likely to admire Republican lawmakers who stood up to
a president of their own party.
Or maybe Bush has long grappled with some serious questions. Perhaps the promise of embryonic stem cells is overrated. If they can offer greater prospects of breakthrough than the existing lines of cells, then why aren’t private-sector investors rushing in with cash?
Economics must have given way to ethics. Might a flood of unintended consequences ensue? For instance, would cash-strapped women be encouraged to get pregnant simply to produce and sell embryonic stem cells?
Take that a step further. What if cost-cutters flooded the developing world for their raw materials? Compassionate conservatism rings with enough pejoratives. There’s no room for genetic colonialism.
Moreover, which part of the debate forced Bush to describe the Senate vote as having “crossed a moral boundary?
Supporters claim stem cells can turn into any kind of cell in the body and may prove to be
extremely useful medically, for example in the treatment of Parkinson’s disease, spinal-cord injuries and Alzheimer’s. They argue that the most promising research into such cells has come from using human embryos. Now that infuriates the religious right.
Bush has said he would allow federal funding for research only on already existing colonies, or “lines”, of embryonic stem cells. By a large margin—63 to 37—senators voted to expand federal funding for research on new lines.
Several prominent Republicans supported the bill, which passed 63- to 27. Majority leader Bill Frist, a medical doctor, and John McCain, both seen as presidential candidates in 2008, were for the bill.
The politics are clear. Opinion polls suggest that stem-cell research is popular. So the Democrats are virtually united in the matter. In the GOP, too, strong alliances have been forged. California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger joined Nancy Reagan, who watched her husband suffer from Alzheimer’s disease, were united in asking the president to sign the bill.
Did Bush – rumbling along the final years of his presidency – veto the bill merely because he felt he could afford to dispense with political considerations? Or was his move intended to bolster the Republicans’ image ahead of November’s midterm poll. Americans would be more likely to admire Republican lawmakers who stood up to
a president of their own party.
Or maybe Bush has long grappled with some serious questions. Perhaps the promise of embryonic stem cells is overrated. If they can offer greater prospects of breakthrough than the existing lines of cells, then why aren’t private-sector investors rushing in with cash?
Economics must have given way to ethics. Might a flood of unintended consequences ensue? For instance, would cash-strapped women be encouraged to get pregnant simply to produce and sell embryonic stem cells?
Take that a step further. What if cost-cutters flooded the developing world for their raw materials? Compassionate conservatism rings with enough pejoratives. There’s no room for genetic colonialism.
Sunday, July 16, 2006
Cold War Comfort Amid Shadowy Insecurity
The comforting part of the craziness of the last week is that the world seems finally to have slipped back into some of the certitudes of the Cold War years.
Post 9/11, our fears emanating from shadowy non-state actors have left us additionally confounded. There’s no way of knowing for sure whether our leaders are projecting the terrorist threat to protect us or their own jobs? A return to more definitive issues of life and death can only be reassuring.
In waging war on two fronts, Israel has proved that conventional notions of security remain at the forefront for those who care. With the Israelis ready to widen the war, the Middle East is in the throes of the kind of regional conflagration that erupted once a decade between the 1940s and 1970s. With Egypt and Jordan formally at peace with the Jewish state, the Hamases and Hezbollahs weren’t inclusive enough among their own constituents to create anything akin to the multi-state combustion of the past.
Unlike past wars, when Iran’s monarchy actually served as a pillar of stability, Teheran is on the side of Hezbollah, the ayatollahs’ clients. Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s words carry great commercial value, too. Every time he threatens to nuke Israel, oil prices shoot up several dollars. But, hey, Ahmadinejad is an elected president. He knows where rhetoric should end and reality must prevail. Deep inside, he probably worries that Israel might extend its right to self-defense all the way to extinguishing Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, buoyed by rising oil prices, has brought his country firmly into that exclusive international club called the G8. His desire to focus the St. Petersburg summit squarely on energy security and infectious diseases may have been upset by the convulsions in the Middle East. But Putin’s ebullience remains undiminished.
While US President George W. Bush lies wounded in his final years in power, Putin is toying with the idea of changing the constitution to extend his tenure in the Kremlin. Now that Putin believes his dog is better than Bush’s, he’s salivating to make his mark on international peace and security. By threatening to veto any U.N. Security Council resolution against North Korea’s missile development program under Chapter VII, Moscow has revived the patron-client relationship that thrived under the communist gerontocracy. (In a pre-summit analysis, one Washington Post columnist anointed Putin as the head of the globe’s anti-democracy bloc.)
The real shift in international equations is underscored by China, whose abstention on key Security Council resolutions Washington and the wider West had come to count on in recent years. Beijing joined Moscow in opposing a Chapter VII resolution on North Korea. The unanimous resolution the Security Council finally adopted has none of the teeth to leave the kind of bite the Bush administration wants on Kim Jong-il’s bottom.
For all the reassurance a return to the verities of the Cold War offers, there is a scary part. Al Qaeda and its cohorts desire precisely this does of complacency in order to plot something big.
Post 9/11, our fears emanating from shadowy non-state actors have left us additionally confounded. There’s no way of knowing for sure whether our leaders are projecting the terrorist threat to protect us or their own jobs? A return to more definitive issues of life and death can only be reassuring.
In waging war on two fronts, Israel has proved that conventional notions of security remain at the forefront for those who care. With the Israelis ready to widen the war, the Middle East is in the throes of the kind of regional conflagration that erupted once a decade between the 1940s and 1970s. With Egypt and Jordan formally at peace with the Jewish state, the Hamases and Hezbollahs weren’t inclusive enough among their own constituents to create anything akin to the multi-state combustion of the past.
Unlike past wars, when Iran’s monarchy actually served as a pillar of stability, Teheran is on the side of Hezbollah, the ayatollahs’ clients. Under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s words carry great commercial value, too. Every time he threatens to nuke Israel, oil prices shoot up several dollars. But, hey, Ahmadinejad is an elected president. He knows where rhetoric should end and reality must prevail. Deep inside, he probably worries that Israel might extend its right to self-defense all the way to extinguishing Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, buoyed by rising oil prices, has brought his country firmly into that exclusive international club called the G8. His desire to focus the St. Petersburg summit squarely on energy security and infectious diseases may have been upset by the convulsions in the Middle East. But Putin’s ebullience remains undiminished.
While US President George W. Bush lies wounded in his final years in power, Putin is toying with the idea of changing the constitution to extend his tenure in the Kremlin. Now that Putin believes his dog is better than Bush’s, he’s salivating to make his mark on international peace and security. By threatening to veto any U.N. Security Council resolution against North Korea’s missile development program under Chapter VII, Moscow has revived the patron-client relationship that thrived under the communist gerontocracy. (In a pre-summit analysis, one Washington Post columnist anointed Putin as the head of the globe’s anti-democracy bloc.)
The real shift in international equations is underscored by China, whose abstention on key Security Council resolutions Washington and the wider West had come to count on in recent years. Beijing joined Moscow in opposing a Chapter VII resolution on North Korea. The unanimous resolution the Security Council finally adopted has none of the teeth to leave the kind of bite the Bush administration wants on Kim Jong-il’s bottom.
For all the reassurance a return to the verities of the Cold War offers, there is a scary part. Al Qaeda and its cohorts desire precisely this does of complacency in order to plot something big.
Thursday, July 13, 2006
Bashar Al Assad’s Grin
Amid Israel’s stepped-up military strikes on Lebanon, in retaliation for the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah’s abduction of two Israeli soldiers, it is hard not to wonder how wide a grin Syrian President Bashar Al Assad must be sporting.
President George W. Bush’s assertion holding Damascus responsible for Hezbollah’s actions must have provided much amusement in official Syrian circles.
During earlier Israel-Hezbollah clashes, the American president could pick up the phone and ask President Hafez Al Assad – Bashar’s dad – to sort things out quickly. For all the bad press he got, Assad Sr. was known for keeping promises – at least the parts that he meant seriously.
Hafez Assad’s love-hate relationship with the US was legendary. Syria would be on or around the State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism. But Warren Christopher, secretary of state during Bill Clinton’s first term in the White House, would have no problem waiting for hours in Damascus to meet the wily old man.
These days, things have gotten a lot complicated, especially since last year when Syria was forced to pull out its troops from Lebanon. Lots of Lebanese disliked the presence of Israeli troops in the south, too. The Israelis withdrew in 2000, providing the rest of the world the unencumbered opportunity to focus its pressure on the Syrians.
The assassination of Rafik Hariri, the billionaire former prime minister of Lebanon, in February last year sealed the Syrians’ fate. The suspected complicity of Syrian government officials in the assassination triggered widespread revulsion, eventually forcing Bashar to call his 14,000 forces home.
The crafty Syrians didn’t exactly lose from the pullout, though. Damascus still calls the shots in Lebanon, especially when it comes to Hezbollah. But now the Syrians don’t feel they have to take responsibility.
Against the backdrop of the indiscriminate Israeli bombing of Lebanese targets, some in the Hariri family, too, must be having second thoughts about the wisdom of evicting the Syrians.
President George W. Bush’s assertion holding Damascus responsible for Hezbollah’s actions must have provided much amusement in official Syrian circles.
During earlier Israel-Hezbollah clashes, the American president could pick up the phone and ask President Hafez Al Assad – Bashar’s dad – to sort things out quickly. For all the bad press he got, Assad Sr. was known for keeping promises – at least the parts that he meant seriously.
Hafez Assad’s love-hate relationship with the US was legendary. Syria would be on or around the State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism. But Warren Christopher, secretary of state during Bill Clinton’s first term in the White House, would have no problem waiting for hours in Damascus to meet the wily old man.
These days, things have gotten a lot complicated, especially since last year when Syria was forced to pull out its troops from Lebanon. Lots of Lebanese disliked the presence of Israeli troops in the south, too. The Israelis withdrew in 2000, providing the rest of the world the unencumbered opportunity to focus its pressure on the Syrians.
The assassination of Rafik Hariri, the billionaire former prime minister of Lebanon, in February last year sealed the Syrians’ fate. The suspected complicity of Syrian government officials in the assassination triggered widespread revulsion, eventually forcing Bashar to call his 14,000 forces home.
The crafty Syrians didn’t exactly lose from the pullout, though. Damascus still calls the shots in Lebanon, especially when it comes to Hezbollah. But now the Syrians don’t feel they have to take responsibility.
Against the backdrop of the indiscriminate Israeli bombing of Lebanese targets, some in the Hariri family, too, must be having second thoughts about the wisdom of evicting the Syrians.
Saturday, July 08, 2006
China Lays Geopolitical Tracks
Apart from being a grand engineering feat, China’s new railway linking the city of Golmud in Qinghai province with Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, is a major geopolitical triumph.
The line is aimed at promoting tourism and trade in the region, as well as at helping with the mining of Tibet’s rich deposits of coal, copper, gold and zinc. Tibet, which has been under the control of Beijing since the 1950s, could soon become less reliant on grants from the central government.
Geopolitically, the railway brings China closer to South Asia, a region traditionally dominated by the other Asian giant, India.
As part of an effort to bolster its growing ties with India, China has teamed up to re-open the Nathu La pass between southern Tibet and India's northeastern state of Sikkim. That pass had remained closed ever since China and India fought a brief blood bloody war in 1962.
For India, the move represents a diplomatic victory of sorts. Beijing has not recognized the incorporation of Sikkim, formerly an independent monarchy, into the Indian union in 1975. Of late, Beijing seems to have moved closer toward recognizing the merger. If anything, the reopening of Nathu La should have been the clearest signal yet of Beijing’s acquiescence.
Indian analysts, however, are more inclined to see the opening of the pass as part of China’s effort to strengthen its foothold in South Asia. And they have good reason.
Last November, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal succeeded in bringing China into the seven-nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an observer. This move caught India by surprise. New Delhi eventually acceded to Beijing’s entry as a price for Afghanistan’s inclusion as a full-fledged member of SAARC.
The following month, India found itself virtually excluded from an emerging East Asian community of nations with China at the center.
The Indian media, which for long had avoided taking up the China-as-an-adversary line, has stepped up coverage in that light. Leading commentators continue to warn the Indian government against placing too much confidence on the burgeoning ties with China. Some have drawn parallels with the months preceding the 1962 war.
Building on its close political and military ties with Pakistan and Myanmar, China is using economic and military means to draw India’s other smaller neighbors into its own sphere of influence. The People’s Liberation Army’s recent incursions and road construction in Bhutanese territory are aimed at pressuring the tiny Himalayan kingdom to end its protectorate ties with India.
Amid a downturn in India’s relations with Bangladesh, over such issues as illegal immigration, Islamist terrorism and trade, China has gained naval access to the Chittagong port. Through a road link with Bangladesh via Myanmar, China hopes to access Bangladesh’s vast natural gas reserves.
China, the major arms supplier to Bangladesh, recently offered to provide Dhaka with nuclear reactor technology, heightening Indian anxieties.
For now, India seems to have brought Nepal back into its own sphere of influence after the kingdom’s heavily pro-Chinese tilt under King Gyanendra’s 15-month direct rule. Although the monarch has lost all of his political powers following weeks of protests – driven in large part by New Delhi – that brought pro-Indian parties back in the saddle, Beijing’s influence in Nepal remain considerable.
China’s growing ties with the Nepalese military and its stated goal of extending the railway line from Lhasa all the way to the Nepalese border suggest it has the landlocked Himalayan nation close in its sights both in terms of its regional policies and the wider imperative of defeating the United States’ policy of containment.
The Qinghai-Tibet railway, built at a cost of around $4.2 billion, runs for 1,140 km at an average elevation of 4,000 meters, making it the highest railway in the world. The project has been one of the most difficult to build, with its long sections of elevated tracks and bevy of bridges and tunnels. The route crosses an active seismic zone and traverses frozen ground saturated with water that can rise or fall by meters as the temperature changes.
Against this background, experts expect a massive overhaul will be needed within a decade. Given the stakes involved, Beijing can be expected to bear both the massive physical challenge as well as the hefty financial cost of keep the trains rolling.
The line is aimed at promoting tourism and trade in the region, as well as at helping with the mining of Tibet’s rich deposits of coal, copper, gold and zinc. Tibet, which has been under the control of Beijing since the 1950s, could soon become less reliant on grants from the central government.
Geopolitically, the railway brings China closer to South Asia, a region traditionally dominated by the other Asian giant, India.
As part of an effort to bolster its growing ties with India, China has teamed up to re-open the Nathu La pass between southern Tibet and India's northeastern state of Sikkim. That pass had remained closed ever since China and India fought a brief blood bloody war in 1962.
For India, the move represents a diplomatic victory of sorts. Beijing has not recognized the incorporation of Sikkim, formerly an independent monarchy, into the Indian union in 1975. Of late, Beijing seems to have moved closer toward recognizing the merger. If anything, the reopening of Nathu La should have been the clearest signal yet of Beijing’s acquiescence.
Indian analysts, however, are more inclined to see the opening of the pass as part of China’s effort to strengthen its foothold in South Asia. And they have good reason.
Last November, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal succeeded in bringing China into the seven-nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an observer. This move caught India by surprise. New Delhi eventually acceded to Beijing’s entry as a price for Afghanistan’s inclusion as a full-fledged member of SAARC.
The following month, India found itself virtually excluded from an emerging East Asian community of nations with China at the center.
The Indian media, which for long had avoided taking up the China-as-an-adversary line, has stepped up coverage in that light. Leading commentators continue to warn the Indian government against placing too much confidence on the burgeoning ties with China. Some have drawn parallels with the months preceding the 1962 war.
Building on its close political and military ties with Pakistan and Myanmar, China is using economic and military means to draw India’s other smaller neighbors into its own sphere of influence. The People’s Liberation Army’s recent incursions and road construction in Bhutanese territory are aimed at pressuring the tiny Himalayan kingdom to end its protectorate ties with India.
Amid a downturn in India’s relations with Bangladesh, over such issues as illegal immigration, Islamist terrorism and trade, China has gained naval access to the Chittagong port. Through a road link with Bangladesh via Myanmar, China hopes to access Bangladesh’s vast natural gas reserves.
China, the major arms supplier to Bangladesh, recently offered to provide Dhaka with nuclear reactor technology, heightening Indian anxieties.
For now, India seems to have brought Nepal back into its own sphere of influence after the kingdom’s heavily pro-Chinese tilt under King Gyanendra’s 15-month direct rule. Although the monarch has lost all of his political powers following weeks of protests – driven in large part by New Delhi – that brought pro-Indian parties back in the saddle, Beijing’s influence in Nepal remain considerable.
China’s growing ties with the Nepalese military and its stated goal of extending the railway line from Lhasa all the way to the Nepalese border suggest it has the landlocked Himalayan nation close in its sights both in terms of its regional policies and the wider imperative of defeating the United States’ policy of containment.
The Qinghai-Tibet railway, built at a cost of around $4.2 billion, runs for 1,140 km at an average elevation of 4,000 meters, making it the highest railway in the world. The project has been one of the most difficult to build, with its long sections of elevated tracks and bevy of bridges and tunnels. The route crosses an active seismic zone and traverses frozen ground saturated with water that can rise or fall by meters as the temperature changes.
Against this background, experts expect a massive overhaul will be needed within a decade. Given the stakes involved, Beijing can be expected to bear both the massive physical challenge as well as the hefty financial cost of keep the trains rolling.
Monday, July 03, 2006
Iran In Putin’s G-8 Gambit
In the run-up to the Group of Eight (G-8) summit he is hosting later this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin is sounding increasingly assured about his country’s role in that exclusive club and the wider world.
Although Russia has been invited to attend annual summits of the world’s industrialized democracies for some years now, this is the first year it has been accepted as a full member of the G-8.
In fact, Moscow was invited to join the G-8 without having attained the economic or democratic development of the other members -- United States, Canada, Japan, Britain, Germany, France and Italy. This exception was made in an effort to spur Russia’s continued progress on the road of free-market economic reforms and as a reward for the post-Soviet democratization process.
As the host of the July 15-17 summit, Putin has shaped the agenda around energy, education, and the eradication of infectious diseases. European nations rely significantly on Russian natural gas supplies. Moscow, which exports oil around the world, recognizes competitively stable energy prices as the key to its long-term economic prosperity.
The other G-8 members, too, have energy high on their minds – but in a less enthusiastic spirit. The Kremlin’s recent effort to tighten control over energy exports has raised concern in Europe. The Putin administration’s suspension of natural gas supplies to Ukraine several months ago – ostensibly for the former Soviet republic’s efforts to pull itself out of Moscow’s orbit -- left Europe with shortages. Europeans seeking assurances of reliable gas supplies from Russia confront a government setting most of the terms.
On the political front, Russia is sliding back to a form of authoritarianism, although not exactly Soviet-style repression. Moscow, moreover, is growing more confrontational in the articulation and implementation of foreign policy.
With Russia having turned its back to the political and economic obligations underpinning its G-8 membership, Putin could find himself having to justify Moscow’s continued presence in the organization.
Putin, for his part, can be expected to use the Iran nuclear crisis to establish Russia’s credentials as a responsible international player, mindful of its effectiveness in deflecting criticism of the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policies.
Although Russia has been invited to attend annual summits of the world’s industrialized democracies for some years now, this is the first year it has been accepted as a full member of the G-8.
In fact, Moscow was invited to join the G-8 without having attained the economic or democratic development of the other members -- United States, Canada, Japan, Britain, Germany, France and Italy. This exception was made in an effort to spur Russia’s continued progress on the road of free-market economic reforms and as a reward for the post-Soviet democratization process.
As the host of the July 15-17 summit, Putin has shaped the agenda around energy, education, and the eradication of infectious diseases. European nations rely significantly on Russian natural gas supplies. Moscow, which exports oil around the world, recognizes competitively stable energy prices as the key to its long-term economic prosperity.
The other G-8 members, too, have energy high on their minds – but in a less enthusiastic spirit. The Kremlin’s recent effort to tighten control over energy exports has raised concern in Europe. The Putin administration’s suspension of natural gas supplies to Ukraine several months ago – ostensibly for the former Soviet republic’s efforts to pull itself out of Moscow’s orbit -- left Europe with shortages. Europeans seeking assurances of reliable gas supplies from Russia confront a government setting most of the terms.
On the political front, Russia is sliding back to a form of authoritarianism, although not exactly Soviet-style repression. Moscow, moreover, is growing more confrontational in the articulation and implementation of foreign policy.
With Russia having turned its back to the political and economic obligations underpinning its G-8 membership, Putin could find himself having to justify Moscow’s continued presence in the organization.
Putin, for his part, can be expected to use the Iran nuclear crisis to establish Russia’s credentials as a responsible international player, mindful of its effectiveness in deflecting criticism of the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policies.
Friday, June 30, 2006
Behind Bush’s WMD Diffidence
The Bush administration’s half-heartedness in disclosing that coalition forces have discovered about 500 shells containing chemical weapons since 2003 -- mostly sarin nerve gas and mustard gas – is perplexing, to say the least.
After all, this White House has been pummeled mercilessly for its apparent failure to find Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, one of the key reasons the US invaded Iraq and overthrew the Baathist regime.
The president and his advisers have been called liars when the Clinton administration and the intelligence agencies of France, Russia and other nations had concluded that Saddam’s chemical-, biological- and nuclear-weapon capabilities posed a serious threat to international peace and stability.
Political opponents of the president and the press – dominated by Bush critics – have either rubbished the latest reports or simply ignored them. It becomes easier to flout the journalistic tenets of accuracy and fairness when the president’s approval ratings dip below 40 percent.
Yet there could have been genuine reasons for the White House’s timidity. If the United States had promptly announced the WMD discoveries, wouldn’t that have been tantamount to leading terrorists, including those from al-Qaeda, to the stockpiles?
This undoubtedly would have placed coalition troops at risk. Forced to choose between a marginal advantage in public relations and exposing troops to further harm, the White House reassuringly opted for the latter.
Speaking of al-Qaeda, a chemical attack would have been a monumental propaganda coup, enhancing recruitment and financial support. For Americans, morale in Iraq and on the home front would have plummeted.
Another reason for the White House diffidence might have been the urgency of protecting informants. The decline in human intelligence has been blamed for most of the bungling of the past decade. The US intelligence community is clearly on a campaign to strengthen its ability to get real information from real people on the ground.
Unprotected informants serve to silence ones still at work and dissuades many from offering their services. Here, too, the wider imperative of boosting America’s human-intelligence capabilities may have taken precedence over some media mileage.
One thing that persuaded the White House to go low key must have been its conviction that nothing would have changed the minds of its opponents in the political arena and the press.
After all, this White House has been pummeled mercilessly for its apparent failure to find Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, one of the key reasons the US invaded Iraq and overthrew the Baathist regime.
The president and his advisers have been called liars when the Clinton administration and the intelligence agencies of France, Russia and other nations had concluded that Saddam’s chemical-, biological- and nuclear-weapon capabilities posed a serious threat to international peace and stability.
Political opponents of the president and the press – dominated by Bush critics – have either rubbished the latest reports or simply ignored them. It becomes easier to flout the journalistic tenets of accuracy and fairness when the president’s approval ratings dip below 40 percent.
Yet there could have been genuine reasons for the White House’s timidity. If the United States had promptly announced the WMD discoveries, wouldn’t that have been tantamount to leading terrorists, including those from al-Qaeda, to the stockpiles?
This undoubtedly would have placed coalition troops at risk. Forced to choose between a marginal advantage in public relations and exposing troops to further harm, the White House reassuringly opted for the latter.
Speaking of al-Qaeda, a chemical attack would have been a monumental propaganda coup, enhancing recruitment and financial support. For Americans, morale in Iraq and on the home front would have plummeted.
Another reason for the White House diffidence might have been the urgency of protecting informants. The decline in human intelligence has been blamed for most of the bungling of the past decade. The US intelligence community is clearly on a campaign to strengthen its ability to get real information from real people on the ground.
Unprotected informants serve to silence ones still at work and dissuades many from offering their services. Here, too, the wider imperative of boosting America’s human-intelligence capabilities may have taken precedence over some media mileage.
One thing that persuaded the White House to go low key must have been its conviction that nothing would have changed the minds of its opponents in the political arena and the press.
Tuesday, June 27, 2006
Roots Of The Taleban’s Resurgence
Afghanistan has seen a dramatic increase in fighting, especially in the southern and central regions. Coalition forces and the Afghan military released a statement June 24 saying they had killed at least 65 Taliban fighters, as part of Operation Mountain Thrust.
More than 10,000 Afghan, NATO, and US forces are taking part in counter-insurgency operations in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul, the stronghold of remnants of the ousted Taleban regime. US and Afghan officials see the operation as an effort to extend the reach of the Afghan government and to expand humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.
“Operation Mountain Thrust is not about just killing and capturing extremists,” Col. Tom Collins, a US army spokesman, told reporters. “It is very much about establishing the conditions where the [Afghan] government can extend its authority into areas where it does not currently have a presence.”
Mohammed Diaoud, the governor of Helmand province, has cautioned against a resurgence of the Taleban. “It’s not as if they are all sleeping,” Diaoud told a reporter. He hastened to add that the Taleban do not “have the ability to fight against such an organized operation." Some expect the security situation to improve as NATO raises the number of troops in Afghanistan from some 9,700 to more than 15,000, mostly where insurgents are most active.
How has the enemy risen from the ashes of defeat? One reason could be that the Taleban were never defeated to the extent we have been led to believe. Pakistan’s President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has been quite selective in his support to the Bush administration’s war on terror. Islamabad has been helpful in the capture of Al Qaeda leaders and in the interception of the organization’s communications. When it comes to the Taleban, Gen. Musharraf has his limitations. The Taleban, after all, was the creation of Pakistan, an organization that was expected to bring order to the factional fighting that followed the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.
True, the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) wing recruited and trained these fighters – fresh graduates of Islamic seminaries that proliferated in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Islamabad’s backing for the Taleban was most substantial during the civilian governments of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. To get a true picture of the dynamics involved in Pakistan, the perception that Islamabad has lost its leverage in Afghanistan with the fall of the Taleban regime must be juxtaposed with the rise in the influence of New Delhi. The most democratically elected government would have a hard time bolstering cooperation with the United States against the Taleban.
Pakistan’s support alone cannot explain the Taleban’s resurgence. Reports from the field speak of younger, more aggressive commanders rising through the ranks and becoming more audacious in their tactics. They have benefited from some of the operational weaknesses among coalition forces. The British and Canadian troops who recently replaced some American forces have not yet acquired the skills of the departing soldiers.
At a broader level, the Taleban have been incorporating tactics employed by insurgents in Iraq. The increasing use of suicide bombers and the selection of high-media-value targets bear the hallmarks of the Iraqi insurgency.
Another shift seems to have occurred. Like the anti-Soviet mujahideen before them, the Taleban preferred to fight in rural areas. Warfare in the region’s rugged terrain is deeply etched in many Pashtun tribes. Recent fighting, however, has been focused in more populous areas.
The role of Al Qaeda comes into focus here. If the organization could join hands with avowedly secular Baathists in an anti-US insurgency in Iraq, Al Qaeda certainly would have fewer reasons not to back the Taleban, a wholly owned subsidiary. The precise relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taleban following the latter’s overthrow in late 2001 remains unclear. Some suggest that the leaders of the two groups have fallen out.
However, if Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri are indeed hiding somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, then it is clear they are doing so at the behest of the Taleban, who enjoy considerable support among the region’s tribals.
Finally, the Iran factor comes into play. With American forces bogged down in the Iraqi insurgency, Iran has been the principal state beneficiary. By pinning down the US military on their eastern flank as well, the mullahs in Teheran must hope to improve their leverage against the Americans on the nuclear and a raft of other issues.
More than 10,000 Afghan, NATO, and US forces are taking part in counter-insurgency operations in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul, the stronghold of remnants of the ousted Taleban regime. US and Afghan officials see the operation as an effort to extend the reach of the Afghan government and to expand humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.
“Operation Mountain Thrust is not about just killing and capturing extremists,” Col. Tom Collins, a US army spokesman, told reporters. “It is very much about establishing the conditions where the [Afghan] government can extend its authority into areas where it does not currently have a presence.”
Mohammed Diaoud, the governor of Helmand province, has cautioned against a resurgence of the Taleban. “It’s not as if they are all sleeping,” Diaoud told a reporter. He hastened to add that the Taleban do not “have the ability to fight against such an organized operation." Some expect the security situation to improve as NATO raises the number of troops in Afghanistan from some 9,700 to more than 15,000, mostly where insurgents are most active.
How has the enemy risen from the ashes of defeat? One reason could be that the Taleban were never defeated to the extent we have been led to believe. Pakistan’s President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has been quite selective in his support to the Bush administration’s war on terror. Islamabad has been helpful in the capture of Al Qaeda leaders and in the interception of the organization’s communications. When it comes to the Taleban, Gen. Musharraf has his limitations. The Taleban, after all, was the creation of Pakistan, an organization that was expected to bring order to the factional fighting that followed the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces.
True, the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) wing recruited and trained these fighters – fresh graduates of Islamic seminaries that proliferated in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Islamabad’s backing for the Taleban was most substantial during the civilian governments of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. To get a true picture of the dynamics involved in Pakistan, the perception that Islamabad has lost its leverage in Afghanistan with the fall of the Taleban regime must be juxtaposed with the rise in the influence of New Delhi. The most democratically elected government would have a hard time bolstering cooperation with the United States against the Taleban.
Pakistan’s support alone cannot explain the Taleban’s resurgence. Reports from the field speak of younger, more aggressive commanders rising through the ranks and becoming more audacious in their tactics. They have benefited from some of the operational weaknesses among coalition forces. The British and Canadian troops who recently replaced some American forces have not yet acquired the skills of the departing soldiers.
At a broader level, the Taleban have been incorporating tactics employed by insurgents in Iraq. The increasing use of suicide bombers and the selection of high-media-value targets bear the hallmarks of the Iraqi insurgency.
Another shift seems to have occurred. Like the anti-Soviet mujahideen before them, the Taleban preferred to fight in rural areas. Warfare in the region’s rugged terrain is deeply etched in many Pashtun tribes. Recent fighting, however, has been focused in more populous areas.
The role of Al Qaeda comes into focus here. If the organization could join hands with avowedly secular Baathists in an anti-US insurgency in Iraq, Al Qaeda certainly would have fewer reasons not to back the Taleban, a wholly owned subsidiary. The precise relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taleban following the latter’s overthrow in late 2001 remains unclear. Some suggest that the leaders of the two groups have fallen out.
However, if Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri are indeed hiding somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, then it is clear they are doing so at the behest of the Taleban, who enjoy considerable support among the region’s tribals.
Finally, the Iran factor comes into play. With American forces bogged down in the Iraqi insurgency, Iran has been the principal state beneficiary. By pinning down the US military on their eastern flank as well, the mullahs in Teheran must hope to improve their leverage against the Americans on the nuclear and a raft of other issues.
Tuesday, June 20, 2006
Beijing To Washington Via Pyongyang?
Those with a bent for deciphering North Korea’s erratic behavior have swung into action following Pyongyang’s reported preparations for testing a long-range missile that one day may be capable of reaching the United States.
Is Kim Jong-il just jealous, as The New York Times pondered, of all the attention Iran has been getting as a result of Tehran's recent nuclear bad behavior, and craves a spotlight of its own? Or is Pyongyang merely operating on a normal defense-modernization schedule? Did the Bush administration somehow instigate this whole crisis in a new effort to justify its own missile-defense program?
Another group of Pyongyang-watchers might be tempted to dismiss such speculation, citing Kim’s personal eccentricities – some would prefer the more precise term instability. If there is any country today where one man symbolizes the state, it has to be North Korea. Where else could you find a regime bent on acquiring the most modern means of destruction while its people are starving?
The Bush administration, which believes the missile is now fully fueled and ready to go, has been warning of devastating consequences this “provocation” would inflict on North Korea.
For all its rhetoric on how 9/11 changed the world as we knew it, President Bush and his advisers are adhering to a Cold War-era arms-control doctrine. Kim knows that an American retaliation against his country – devastating as that would be -- would also destabilize South Korea and Japan and beyond. Moreover, mutual assured destruction is not a smart deterrent in an age of suicide bombers, most of who tend to be clinically sane until the very end.
Perhaps the answer lies in China, Kim’s principal -- and many believe only – ally. The Chinese have been at the forefront of the six-party talks on North Korea, winning praise from the Bush administration. In the U.N. Security Council, American diplomats know that even if they cannot get Beijing to vote with Washington, the Chinese could make things easier by abstaining.
Admittedly, U.S.-Chinese relations have undergone a remarkable upswing since the spring of 2001 when a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing in China after what officials described as a "minor" mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter jet.
The fallout was anything but minor: political and military tensions between the two countries had plunged to such depths in a generation. Of course, 9/11 and the war on terrorism brought the two countries closer. After all, China was battling its own version of Islamic separatism in the restive region of Xinjiang.
But China seems to be having second thoughts about whether the Bush administration really abandoned the neocons’ “containment” strategy. If Washington’s honeymoon with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf could end in such short notice, China’s communist leaders could not be so confident, could they?
The pointers were clear. In February, the Pentagon released its Quadrennial Defense Review, which listed, among other things, traditional threats by “near-peer” powers like China. In its annual report to Congress on China's military, the Defense Department refocused on China's growing maritime capabilities. Both virtually resurrected the “China threat.”
The resignation of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in Beijing’s view, brought the clearest indication of a hardening of the Bush administration’s posture. Zoellick, who did not give a reason for quitting, was the architect of a more engagement-based U.S. policy on China. As a “responsible stakeholder,” according to the Zoellick approach, China could cooperate globally with the United States. In fact, the two governments had created a permanent panel – which Zoellick led from the American side – to discuss global issues and events.
If Washington could revert to a pre-9/11 posture, so could Beijing. Did the Chinese leadership decide to send that message through North Korea – for added emphasis?
Is Kim Jong-il just jealous, as The New York Times pondered, of all the attention Iran has been getting as a result of Tehran's recent nuclear bad behavior, and craves a spotlight of its own? Or is Pyongyang merely operating on a normal defense-modernization schedule? Did the Bush administration somehow instigate this whole crisis in a new effort to justify its own missile-defense program?
Another group of Pyongyang-watchers might be tempted to dismiss such speculation, citing Kim’s personal eccentricities – some would prefer the more precise term instability. If there is any country today where one man symbolizes the state, it has to be North Korea. Where else could you find a regime bent on acquiring the most modern means of destruction while its people are starving?
The Bush administration, which believes the missile is now fully fueled and ready to go, has been warning of devastating consequences this “provocation” would inflict on North Korea.
For all its rhetoric on how 9/11 changed the world as we knew it, President Bush and his advisers are adhering to a Cold War-era arms-control doctrine. Kim knows that an American retaliation against his country – devastating as that would be -- would also destabilize South Korea and Japan and beyond. Moreover, mutual assured destruction is not a smart deterrent in an age of suicide bombers, most of who tend to be clinically sane until the very end.
Perhaps the answer lies in China, Kim’s principal -- and many believe only – ally. The Chinese have been at the forefront of the six-party talks on North Korea, winning praise from the Bush administration. In the U.N. Security Council, American diplomats know that even if they cannot get Beijing to vote with Washington, the Chinese could make things easier by abstaining.
Admittedly, U.S.-Chinese relations have undergone a remarkable upswing since the spring of 2001 when a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing in China after what officials described as a "minor" mid-air collision with a Chinese fighter jet.
The fallout was anything but minor: political and military tensions between the two countries had plunged to such depths in a generation. Of course, 9/11 and the war on terrorism brought the two countries closer. After all, China was battling its own version of Islamic separatism in the restive region of Xinjiang.
But China seems to be having second thoughts about whether the Bush administration really abandoned the neocons’ “containment” strategy. If Washington’s honeymoon with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf could end in such short notice, China’s communist leaders could not be so confident, could they?
The pointers were clear. In February, the Pentagon released its Quadrennial Defense Review, which listed, among other things, traditional threats by “near-peer” powers like China. In its annual report to Congress on China's military, the Defense Department refocused on China's growing maritime capabilities. Both virtually resurrected the “China threat.”
The resignation of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, in Beijing’s view, brought the clearest indication of a hardening of the Bush administration’s posture. Zoellick, who did not give a reason for quitting, was the architect of a more engagement-based U.S. policy on China. As a “responsible stakeholder,” according to the Zoellick approach, China could cooperate globally with the United States. In fact, the two governments had created a permanent panel – which Zoellick led from the American side – to discuss global issues and events.
If Washington could revert to a pre-9/11 posture, so could Beijing. Did the Chinese leadership decide to send that message through North Korea – for added emphasis?
Friday, June 16, 2006
Iraq: Amnesty No Slur On Sacrifice
When Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki, a Shia, unveiled a national reconciliation policy that includes the possibility of an amnesty for sections of the predominantly Sunni insurgency, he knew he would meet stiff opposition in Washington.
With the American military’s death toll having crossed the 2,500 mark since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the “sacrifice-in-vain” argument against an amnesty is bound to gain momentum among families of the victims, their elected representatives and wider American society.
Realities on the ground offer an opportunity for more sobering thought. In the aftermath of the killing of Abu Musaub Al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the American have been reminded how the foreign jihadists represent only a portion of the insurgency that shows no sign of abating. For planners in American and Iraq alike, however, the urgency of taming the indigenous militants has always been pressing. The government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi tried to push an amnesty but succumbed to American pressure.
It might never be known how significantly the US decision to disband Saddam Hussein’s military went on to shape the insurgency. In the run-up to the invasion, the media widely quoted experts and analysts who suggested a serious risk of urban warfare by Saddam’s military once US-British forces advanced on Baghdad.
Are the insurgents members of the same divisions that melted away without a fight on the fringes of the Iraqi capital in the final days of the invasion? The time needed to find out for sure would doubtless claim more American lives. More importantly, the raging insurgency will continue to kill and maim infinitely more Iraqis.
Admittedly, Zarqawi’s departure marks a serious blow to the jihadist component of the insurgency, more so in psychological than in operational terms. It is imperative to use an amnesty to separate Iraqi nationalist insurgents from jihadists when it has the greatest chance of working. Indeed, a targeted amnesty may be Iraq’s last hope of surviving as one nation.
Zarqawi’s real legacy – the sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis – casts a more dangerous shadow on Iraq, a reality Maliki recognizes. By appointing Sunni and Shia former army officers as defense and interior ministers respectively, the new prime minister has provided a small but real opening.
If the Shias, Kurds and mainstream Sunnis are sufficiently assured that an amnesty would foster reconciliation by bringing Sunni insurgents into the political process, outsiders should not have a veto.
An Iraq steadily gaining the peace and stability required to emerge as a vibrant democracy will have been worth the enormous sacrifices Iraqis, Americans, Britons and countless others have made.
With the American military’s death toll having crossed the 2,500 mark since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the “sacrifice-in-vain” argument against an amnesty is bound to gain momentum among families of the victims, their elected representatives and wider American society.
Realities on the ground offer an opportunity for more sobering thought. In the aftermath of the killing of Abu Musaub Al Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the American have been reminded how the foreign jihadists represent only a portion of the insurgency that shows no sign of abating. For planners in American and Iraq alike, however, the urgency of taming the indigenous militants has always been pressing. The government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi tried to push an amnesty but succumbed to American pressure.
It might never be known how significantly the US decision to disband Saddam Hussein’s military went on to shape the insurgency. In the run-up to the invasion, the media widely quoted experts and analysts who suggested a serious risk of urban warfare by Saddam’s military once US-British forces advanced on Baghdad.
Are the insurgents members of the same divisions that melted away without a fight on the fringes of the Iraqi capital in the final days of the invasion? The time needed to find out for sure would doubtless claim more American lives. More importantly, the raging insurgency will continue to kill and maim infinitely more Iraqis.
Admittedly, Zarqawi’s departure marks a serious blow to the jihadist component of the insurgency, more so in psychological than in operational terms. It is imperative to use an amnesty to separate Iraqi nationalist insurgents from jihadists when it has the greatest chance of working. Indeed, a targeted amnesty may be Iraq’s last hope of surviving as one nation.
Zarqawi’s real legacy – the sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis – casts a more dangerous shadow on Iraq, a reality Maliki recognizes. By appointing Sunni and Shia former army officers as defense and interior ministers respectively, the new prime minister has provided a small but real opening.
If the Shias, Kurds and mainstream Sunnis are sufficiently assured that an amnesty would foster reconciliation by bringing Sunni insurgents into the political process, outsiders should not have a veto.
An Iraq steadily gaining the peace and stability required to emerge as a vibrant democracy will have been worth the enormous sacrifices Iraqis, Americans, Britons and countless others have made.
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
China’s Year Of The Doghouse
The Year of the Dog seems to be gnawing at China’s international image with unusual ferocity. In a scathing report this week, Amnesty International accused China of stoking conflicts in Sudan, Burma and Nepal by selling arms to those regimes shunned by the rest of the world.
Striking at the basis of China’s emergence as a principal global player, the London-based human rights watchdog said: “China's arms exports, estimated to be in excess of one billion dollars a year often involve the exchange of weapons for raw materials to fuel the country's rapid economic growth.”
Such interests, according to a separate story by the Inter Press Service, has led China, a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council, to block to US efforts to impose economic and military sanctions on recalcitrant countries.
Rejecting the AI report, Beijing insists it has been exporting conventional weapons properly in the light of international rules. Teng Jianqun, a researcher with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told Xinhua news agency that China has always put its limited arms export under strict control and surveillance.
He noted that China adheres to three principles in arms trade: it should help enhance the self-defense capability of import countries, should not impair regional and global peace, security and stability, and should not be used to interfere with other countries' internal affairs.
Before the ethical dimensions of Chinese arms sales could fully settle in, Apple announced it is investigating a newspaper report that staff in some of its Chinese iPod factories work long hours for low pay and in “slave” conditions.
Britain’s Mail on Sunday newspaper alleged that workers received as little as £27 a month, doing 15-hour shifts making the iconic mp3 player. Employees at the factory lived in dormitories housing 100 people and outsiders were banned, the newspaper said. Apple said it did not tolerate its supplier code of conduct being broken. “Apple is committed to ensuring that working conditions in our supply chain are safe, workers are treated with respect and dignity, and manufacturing processes are environmentally responsible,” the company said in a statement.
Apple added it is investigating the allegations regarding working conditions in the iPod manufacturing plant in China.
Could there be a broader agenda at work here? The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the world of its principal bogeyman (although some would still say an “inspiration”.)
The new baddies – Baathist Iraq, Iran, North Korea, for instance – couldn’t rise to the level of the Soviet threat that kept the world on its toes. Among many, nostalgia for the Cold War set in deep. In light of subsequent events, many must have wondered, might an Afghanistan Soviet Socialist Republic have done more for regional and even global security?
The idea of a grand alliance of disparate groups behind the demonization of China is not as far-fetched as it sounds. The steep rise in gas prices? Blame the booming Chinese middle class. Criticism of increased military spending on conventional threats in the midst of our new kind of war (on terror)? Point to Taiwan. Economic instability? Ah, those clever currency manipulators in Beijing.
The enduring moral of the Cold War: Make sure you always have someone else you can blame for when things go wrong.
Striking at the basis of China’s emergence as a principal global player, the London-based human rights watchdog said: “China's arms exports, estimated to be in excess of one billion dollars a year often involve the exchange of weapons for raw materials to fuel the country's rapid economic growth.”
Such interests, according to a separate story by the Inter Press Service, has led China, a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council, to block to US efforts to impose economic and military sanctions on recalcitrant countries.
Rejecting the AI report, Beijing insists it has been exporting conventional weapons properly in the light of international rules. Teng Jianqun, a researcher with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, told Xinhua news agency that China has always put its limited arms export under strict control and surveillance.
He noted that China adheres to three principles in arms trade: it should help enhance the self-defense capability of import countries, should not impair regional and global peace, security and stability, and should not be used to interfere with other countries' internal affairs.
Before the ethical dimensions of Chinese arms sales could fully settle in, Apple announced it is investigating a newspaper report that staff in some of its Chinese iPod factories work long hours for low pay and in “slave” conditions.
Britain’s Mail on Sunday newspaper alleged that workers received as little as £27 a month, doing 15-hour shifts making the iconic mp3 player. Employees at the factory lived in dormitories housing 100 people and outsiders were banned, the newspaper said. Apple said it did not tolerate its supplier code of conduct being broken. “Apple is committed to ensuring that working conditions in our supply chain are safe, workers are treated with respect and dignity, and manufacturing processes are environmentally responsible,” the company said in a statement.
Apple added it is investigating the allegations regarding working conditions in the iPod manufacturing plant in China.
Could there be a broader agenda at work here? The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the world of its principal bogeyman (although some would still say an “inspiration”.)
The new baddies – Baathist Iraq, Iran, North Korea, for instance – couldn’t rise to the level of the Soviet threat that kept the world on its toes. Among many, nostalgia for the Cold War set in deep. In light of subsequent events, many must have wondered, might an Afghanistan Soviet Socialist Republic have done more for regional and even global security?
The idea of a grand alliance of disparate groups behind the demonization of China is not as far-fetched as it sounds. The steep rise in gas prices? Blame the booming Chinese middle class. Criticism of increased military spending on conventional threats in the midst of our new kind of war (on terror)? Point to Taiwan. Economic instability? Ah, those clever currency manipulators in Beijing.
The enduring moral of the Cold War: Make sure you always have someone else you can blame for when things go wrong.
Monday, June 12, 2006
President Garcia Confronts A Polarized Society
For many in Washington, the temptation to portray Peru’s recent presidential election as less a victory for Alan Garcia and more a defeat for Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez will persist. The prospect of another domino falling into the Venezuela-Cuba-Bolivia league had kept the Bush administration on its toes.
By returning to power after a gap of 16 years in a second round run-off against Ollanta Humala, a former army officer, the 57-year-old Garcia evidently feels vindicated. His first term in office, between 1985 and 1990 was a fiasco.
With corruption charges persistently hovering over him, Garcia’s rule saw Peru going bankrupt. Inflation skyrocketed as the currency nosedived exacerbating the economic pain of large segments of the population. This helped the Maoist Shining Path guerrillas to expand its influence across the country.
If Peruvians have given the social democratic leader another chance, they have done so with the primary intention of denying Humala power.
During the campaign, Garcia tried hard to show Peruvians that he had matured in the intervening years. Surely, he will be careful not to repeat the mistakes of his first term.
But his task is compounded by the fact that he has to govern a splintered society.
Garcia has acknowledged this reality by promising a broad government staffed by officials drawn from a wide spectrum of parties and political tendencies. There is a flip side to a unity government: the polarization of Peruvian society will have moved into his administration to paralyze decision making.
Although he lost, Humala carried 14 of Peru's 24 administrative regions and swept his stronghold in the southern highlands, where the country's poor and indigenous population is concentrated, receiving 80 percent of the votes. Simply put, he retains the ability to politicize Peru's disadvantaged and mobilize them into a cohesive group.
One thing going for Garcia is his pro-US policies and good neighborly attitude. Befriending Washington as well as moderate leftwing governments in Chile and Brazil would remain the principal tenet of his foreign policy.
For most Peruvians, Garcia will have to produce results closer to home. The new president needs massive investment, particularly from the United States, to harness his country’s vast natural resources and to ensure a profitable market for exports.
Garcia’s victory saved the recently negotiated Peru-US trade accord. How far Washington chooses to go toward rewarding that achievement would determine the momentum the second Garcia administration ends up acquiring in the weeks and months ahead.
By returning to power after a gap of 16 years in a second round run-off against Ollanta Humala, a former army officer, the 57-year-old Garcia evidently feels vindicated. His first term in office, between 1985 and 1990 was a fiasco.
With corruption charges persistently hovering over him, Garcia’s rule saw Peru going bankrupt. Inflation skyrocketed as the currency nosedived exacerbating the economic pain of large segments of the population. This helped the Maoist Shining Path guerrillas to expand its influence across the country.
If Peruvians have given the social democratic leader another chance, they have done so with the primary intention of denying Humala power.
During the campaign, Garcia tried hard to show Peruvians that he had matured in the intervening years. Surely, he will be careful not to repeat the mistakes of his first term.
But his task is compounded by the fact that he has to govern a splintered society.
Garcia has acknowledged this reality by promising a broad government staffed by officials drawn from a wide spectrum of parties and political tendencies. There is a flip side to a unity government: the polarization of Peruvian society will have moved into his administration to paralyze decision making.
Although he lost, Humala carried 14 of Peru's 24 administrative regions and swept his stronghold in the southern highlands, where the country's poor and indigenous population is concentrated, receiving 80 percent of the votes. Simply put, he retains the ability to politicize Peru's disadvantaged and mobilize them into a cohesive group.
One thing going for Garcia is his pro-US policies and good neighborly attitude. Befriending Washington as well as moderate leftwing governments in Chile and Brazil would remain the principal tenet of his foreign policy.
For most Peruvians, Garcia will have to produce results closer to home. The new president needs massive investment, particularly from the United States, to harness his country’s vast natural resources and to ensure a profitable market for exports.
Garcia’s victory saved the recently negotiated Peru-US trade accord. How far Washington chooses to go toward rewarding that achievement would determine the momentum the second Garcia administration ends up acquiring in the weeks and months ahead.
Thursday, June 08, 2006
Follow The Hawala Trail
How could Abu Musaub Al Zarqawi’s head – bloated alright -- be found in one piece amid the rubble left by two 500-lb bombs? His remains, we were told, were identified by sight and by finger-prints. So the tip of at least one of his fingers was intact.
Who’s going to pocket the $25 million bounty on the self-proclaimed leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq? More importantly, who turned him in?
Whoever had the most to lose from al-Zarqawi alive. Iraqis, Americans, Muslims from other countries were victims of the Jordanian terrorist who shot to prominence with the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003. That attack, which claimed the top UN official responsible for Iraq and dozens others, marked the onset of the insurgency.
Zarqawi’s death was undoubtedly a huge psychological victory over the insurgents. But, as President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and top Iraqi officials insisted, Zarqawi’s death does not diminish the threat he posed alive.
A lanky bearded fellow huddled somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was troubled by Zarqawi’s transformation from a small-time radical into one of the world’s most feared men.
Here was a fighter who was always at the front – actually multiple fronts -- not sermonizing from some cave or crevasse once in a while. Equally at ease with IEDs and the Internet, Zarqawi was constantly seeking to innovate. He had acquired such mythical standing among his adversaries that his clumsiness with that rifle didn’t detract from his legend.
Clearly, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri were more than troubled by Zarqawi rise. They feared him as a potential rival with multitudes of radicals behind him ready to kill or die for the cause. The Al Qaeda top brass just couldn’t find a good reason to discredit Zarqawi. True, the way he fanned Shia-Sunni violence spilled too much Muslim blood in a war that was officially against the infidels. Before Bin Laden could condemn Zarqawi’s methods, he recognized how powerfully they worked. After all, killing yourself and your co-religionists for the larger good was sanctioned under jihad.
Iraqi and American military officials have said the plan to kill Zarqawi was the culmination of weeks of sifting through tips and tracking down credible leaders. It generally takes bin Laden several weeks to deliver his tapes to Al Jazeera. Maybe the Al Qaeda leader used a similar channel of couriers to order his lieutenants to liquidate Zarqawi.
While we’re at it, maybe that last tape from bin Laden contained a coded message to loyalists to lead the American and Iraqi forces to Zarqawi and then commiserate in his “martyrdom”. It won’t hurt to start following the hawala trail for signs of some of that $25 million.
Who’s going to pocket the $25 million bounty on the self-proclaimed leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq? More importantly, who turned him in?
Whoever had the most to lose from al-Zarqawi alive. Iraqis, Americans, Muslims from other countries were victims of the Jordanian terrorist who shot to prominence with the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003. That attack, which claimed the top UN official responsible for Iraq and dozens others, marked the onset of the insurgency.
Zarqawi’s death was undoubtedly a huge psychological victory over the insurgents. But, as President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and top Iraqi officials insisted, Zarqawi’s death does not diminish the threat he posed alive.
A lanky bearded fellow huddled somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was troubled by Zarqawi’s transformation from a small-time radical into one of the world’s most feared men.
Here was a fighter who was always at the front – actually multiple fronts -- not sermonizing from some cave or crevasse once in a while. Equally at ease with IEDs and the Internet, Zarqawi was constantly seeking to innovate. He had acquired such mythical standing among his adversaries that his clumsiness with that rifle didn’t detract from his legend.
Clearly, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri were more than troubled by Zarqawi rise. They feared him as a potential rival with multitudes of radicals behind him ready to kill or die for the cause. The Al Qaeda top brass just couldn’t find a good reason to discredit Zarqawi. True, the way he fanned Shia-Sunni violence spilled too much Muslim blood in a war that was officially against the infidels. Before Bin Laden could condemn Zarqawi’s methods, he recognized how powerfully they worked. After all, killing yourself and your co-religionists for the larger good was sanctioned under jihad.
Iraqi and American military officials have said the plan to kill Zarqawi was the culmination of weeks of sifting through tips and tracking down credible leaders. It generally takes bin Laden several weeks to deliver his tapes to Al Jazeera. Maybe the Al Qaeda leader used a similar channel of couriers to order his lieutenants to liquidate Zarqawi.
While we’re at it, maybe that last tape from bin Laden contained a coded message to loyalists to lead the American and Iraqi forces to Zarqawi and then commiserate in his “martyrdom”. It won’t hurt to start following the hawala trail for signs of some of that $25 million.
Wednesday, June 07, 2006
Making Somalia Too Dangerous For Al Qaeda
The faint possibility of a diplomatic solution to the crisis over
During the waning weeks of the first Bush administration, the
After American forces sustained heavy casualties in a fierce operation in
After 9/11,
After longtime ruler Mohammed Siad Barre was toppled in a coup in 1991,
Militias belonging to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) started battling an alliance of warlords in the south, leading to hundreds of deaths.
The UIC proposes Islam as a way to bring unity to
The scars immortalized in Black Hawk Down, coupled with the quagmire in
Because of its geographical location,
Stepped-up American support for the rival warlords might seem ill-advised, considering what
Sunday, June 04, 2006
Let’s Not Glorify The Gulag
In the post-World War II military history of the United States, the reflexive presumption of guilt some Americans have vis-à-vis the brave men and women in uniform will surely stand out as a principal unvanquished adversary.
Exotic proper nouns like My Lai, Abu Ghraib and, now, Haditha have become metaphors for the brutality American strength is capable of unleashing. War has always been ugly. And it gotten uglier as the enemy has become obscurers. Roadside bombs, snipers aiming from residential areas, rockets fired from donkey carts have replaced missile silos, elite battalions and bomb shelters as searchable targets. The world’s most advanced fighting force is contending with warriors whose defenses are as unsuspecting as the channels of detestation.
Even before the official enquiry has gained pace, the details of what happened in Haditha on November 19 last year are graphic. A four-Humvee convoy of US marines from Kilo company was patrolling the town. A white taxi drew near. Marines signaled for it to stop. A bomb exploded beneath the fourth Humvee, killing its driver.
What happened next? The American soldiers said 15 civilians were killed in the explosion along with the driver. Someone then started shooting at the US soldiers, who returned fire, killing eight insurgents.
A Time magazine investigation published in March, however, found evidence of a massacre. Witnesses claim that the Americans were not fired on. Worse, the civilians who died that day – as many as 24 -- were murdered by the marines.
The Americans ordered five occupants of the white taxi, whom they may have suspected of involvement in the bombing, to lie down. They ran away instead, and the marines shot them. Then, some of the marines allegedly burst into nearby houses and killed 19 more people, only one of whom had a gun. The dead reportedly included eight women, a child and an elderly man in a wheelchair.
When President Bush ordered the invasion and occupation of Iraq, citing, among other things, the murderous nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the White House set for itself a higher standard. Americans are justified in expecting their military to follow a more civilized set of rules. Without Time’s expose, the world might not have learned of the tragedy. Americans still do not know how high up the Marine Corps chain of command the original cover-up went. How did the president, the defense secretary and other
top officials respond when they first learned of the false reporting.
Americans need to be told what steps are now being taken, besides remedial ethics training, to make sure that such crimes against civilians and such deliberate falsifications of the record do not recur.
The media must maintain sufficient vigilance on this story, in the face of competing ones, so that the investigation is transparent and the legal course – if any is required – reaches its logical conclusion.
Jumping to conclusions before all the facts are out does not serve any useful purposes. Comparing Guantanamo Bay with the Soviet Gulag, moreover, is tantamount to absolving Stalin and his henchmen of their worst excesses. Americans expect their politicians to be better than that, even in an election year.
Exotic proper nouns like My Lai, Abu Ghraib and, now, Haditha have become metaphors for the brutality American strength is capable of unleashing. War has always been ugly. And it gotten uglier as the enemy has become obscurers. Roadside bombs, snipers aiming from residential areas, rockets fired from donkey carts have replaced missile silos, elite battalions and bomb shelters as searchable targets. The world’s most advanced fighting force is contending with warriors whose defenses are as unsuspecting as the channels of detestation.
Even before the official enquiry has gained pace, the details of what happened in Haditha on November 19 last year are graphic. A four-Humvee convoy of US marines from Kilo company was patrolling the town. A white taxi drew near. Marines signaled for it to stop. A bomb exploded beneath the fourth Humvee, killing its driver.
What happened next? The American soldiers said 15 civilians were killed in the explosion along with the driver. Someone then started shooting at the US soldiers, who returned fire, killing eight insurgents.
A Time magazine investigation published in March, however, found evidence of a massacre. Witnesses claim that the Americans were not fired on. Worse, the civilians who died that day – as many as 24 -- were murdered by the marines.
The Americans ordered five occupants of the white taxi, whom they may have suspected of involvement in the bombing, to lie down. They ran away instead, and the marines shot them. Then, some of the marines allegedly burst into nearby houses and killed 19 more people, only one of whom had a gun. The dead reportedly included eight women, a child and an elderly man in a wheelchair.
When President Bush ordered the invasion and occupation of Iraq, citing, among other things, the murderous nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the White House set for itself a higher standard. Americans are justified in expecting their military to follow a more civilized set of rules. Without Time’s expose, the world might not have learned of the tragedy. Americans still do not know how high up the Marine Corps chain of command the original cover-up went. How did the president, the defense secretary and other
top officials respond when they first learned of the false reporting.
Americans need to be told what steps are now being taken, besides remedial ethics training, to make sure that such crimes against civilians and such deliberate falsifications of the record do not recur.
The media must maintain sufficient vigilance on this story, in the face of competing ones, so that the investigation is transparent and the legal course – if any is required – reaches its logical conclusion.
Jumping to conclusions before all the facts are out does not serve any useful purposes. Comparing Guantanamo Bay with the Soviet Gulag, moreover, is tantamount to absolving Stalin and his henchmen of their worst excesses. Americans expect their politicians to be better than that, even in an election year.
Thursday, June 01, 2006
Why Would Iran Want To Talk?
Just as the skeptics were saying all along, Iran has taken the United States for another ride. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Thursday his government was open to talks with the United States on his country’s nuclear program, but he rejected the U.S. precondition that it must quit enriching uranium first.
Mottaki was responding to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who said the previous day that the United States would be willing to talk with Iran if it suspended its uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
The U.S. offer to negotiate was seen as a major policy shift. Washington has had no high-level talks with Teheran for more than 25 years. The two countries formally broke off relations in 1980, after the seizure of the American embassy in the Iranian capital in 1979.
Many in the United States have faulted America’s systematic isolation of Iran – once a famously staunch American ally with a proud civilization -- for the escalation of tensions. If the mullahs went on the warpath, it was only because of the strong support successive U.S. administrations of both parties provided the Shah’s brutal dictatorship which the Islamic Revolution overthrew.
So the Bush administration got a rare round of applause from leading newspaper editorials for demonstrating “maturity.” Lost in the exultation was the fact that it was Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who first broached the issue of direct talks, not the other way around.
Bush, for his part, appeared to exude a sense of vindication. Teheran’s repudiation, after all, proved that critics of his administration’s hard stance against Iran were wrong. At the end of a cabinet meeting, the U.S. president conceded that it remained to be seen if Iran's seemingly-negative response to the proposal was its last word on the subject.
Bush had enough cover to revert to his characteristic toughness. Foreign ministers of the five permanent U.N. Security Council member countries and Germany, meeting in Vienna, reached agreement on a package of incentives for Iran to halt sensitive nuclear activities, or penalties if it refuses. The offer will now be formally conveyed to Iran.
The so-called "carrots and sticks" package would offer Iran a set of financial and technology incentives if it ended uranium enrichment and returned to nuclear negotiations with Britain, France and Germany. If it refuses, there would be U.N. Security Council action against Iran and escalating sanctions.
But isn’t there a simpler question here? Why should Iran feel the urgency to hold direct talks with the United States when it has the stick of the resurgent Shias next door in Iraq to wield against Washington? And who knows? Mullah Omar of the Taleban may be the latest beneficiary of Teheran’s oil-generated largesse, considering the seriousness the anti-American insurgency has acquired in Afghanistan, another neighbor.
Moreover, each time Ahmadinejad threatens to nuke Israel off the map, he send oil prices shooting up a couple of dollars. That kind of cash inflow would goad Teheran to widen its gaze for potential allies against America, not grovel before the Great Satan it believes it can bog down across its eastern and western borders.
Mottaki was responding to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who said the previous day that the United States would be willing to talk with Iran if it suspended its uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
The U.S. offer to negotiate was seen as a major policy shift. Washington has had no high-level talks with Teheran for more than 25 years. The two countries formally broke off relations in 1980, after the seizure of the American embassy in the Iranian capital in 1979.
Many in the United States have faulted America’s systematic isolation of Iran – once a famously staunch American ally with a proud civilization -- for the escalation of tensions. If the mullahs went on the warpath, it was only because of the strong support successive U.S. administrations of both parties provided the Shah’s brutal dictatorship which the Islamic Revolution overthrew.
So the Bush administration got a rare round of applause from leading newspaper editorials for demonstrating “maturity.” Lost in the exultation was the fact that it was Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who first broached the issue of direct talks, not the other way around.
Bush, for his part, appeared to exude a sense of vindication. Teheran’s repudiation, after all, proved that critics of his administration’s hard stance against Iran were wrong. At the end of a cabinet meeting, the U.S. president conceded that it remained to be seen if Iran's seemingly-negative response to the proposal was its last word on the subject.
Bush had enough cover to revert to his characteristic toughness. Foreign ministers of the five permanent U.N. Security Council member countries and Germany, meeting in Vienna, reached agreement on a package of incentives for Iran to halt sensitive nuclear activities, or penalties if it refuses. The offer will now be formally conveyed to Iran.
The so-called "carrots and sticks" package would offer Iran a set of financial and technology incentives if it ended uranium enrichment and returned to nuclear negotiations with Britain, France and Germany. If it refuses, there would be U.N. Security Council action against Iran and escalating sanctions.
But isn’t there a simpler question here? Why should Iran feel the urgency to hold direct talks with the United States when it has the stick of the resurgent Shias next door in Iraq to wield against Washington? And who knows? Mullah Omar of the Taleban may be the latest beneficiary of Teheran’s oil-generated largesse, considering the seriousness the anti-American insurgency has acquired in Afghanistan, another neighbor.
Moreover, each time Ahmadinejad threatens to nuke Israel off the map, he send oil prices shooting up a couple of dollars. That kind of cash inflow would goad Teheran to widen its gaze for potential allies against America, not grovel before the Great Satan it believes it can bog down across its eastern and western borders.
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